the weekly Standard

JUNE 30, 2003 / $3.95

UNCONVENTIONAL MYSTERIES
Steve Lenzner

Democrats Go Off the Cliff

David Brook

#BXNFMVD ****** 5-DIGIT 94301
#UNZ0555B096 1#302604 WK 005376
RON UNZ NOV 29 04 000031
371 BALN 000399
555 BRYANT ST 001
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POWER THAT'S MADE IN AMERICA.

Electricity from coal can strengthen America's future for centuries to come.



Electricity from coal is America's major source of affordable and reliable power. We get more than half our electricity from coal and have known reserves to meet our needs for over 250 years. Coal-generated electricity is not only abundant, it is increasingly clean. We've reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide by 40% and will reduce nitrogen oxides emissions by the same amount by 2004. This has occurred even as electricity generated from coal has increased dramatically. America can rely on electricity from coal to drive our economy, secure our future and maintain our quality of life for centuries to come. That's a powerful source of comfort for today and the future.

CARE

THE COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE AND RELIABLE ENERGY

www.CAREenergy.com | Electricity from coal. Affordable. Reliable. Increasingly clean.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

June 30, 2003 • Volume 8, Number 41

2 Scrapbook ..... *Reality Check, Paul Begala, and more.*

4 Casual ..... *Fred Barnes, master of brevity.*

6 Correspondence ..... *On spam, Hong Kong, etc.*

9 Editorial..... *John Ashcroft's Lazy Critics*

Articles

11 The War Against Bush *They were split over Saddam, but Dems are united against the president....* BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

14 The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia *Dubious allies in the war on terror.....* BY MATTHEW A. LEVITT

18 Not a Leap of Faith *The empirical case for faith-based social services.....* BY JOHN J. DIIULIO JR.

21 Put Out Better Flags *Let's unfurl some new designs.....* BY STEVE CHAPMAN

Cover: Thomas Fluharty

Features

23 Democrats Go off the Cliff

Powerlessness corrupts..... BY DAVID BROOKS

27 The Origins of McCarthyism

What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it?..... BY ROBERT D. NOVAK

Books & Arts

31 Crime & Punishment? *Bill James's unconventional mystery novels.....* BY STEVE LENZNER

33 Unsocial Gospel *D.G. Hart on American Protestantism.....* BY ROBERT W. PATTERSON

36 Band of Neighbors *The sons of Bedford on D-Day.....* BY JAMES W. HALEY JR.

38 Father of Faith *David Klinghoffer's life of Abraham.....* BY LILA ARZUA

39 THE STANDARD READER ..... *In brief: Fred Barnes on David Halberstam, Jamie M. Fly on Beppe Severgnini.*

40 Parody ..... *C-SPAN nabs Lynch exclusive.*

William Kristol, *Editor* **Fred Barnes,** *Executive Editor*
David Tell, *Opinion Editor* **David Brooks, Christopher Caldwell,** *Senior Editors* **Richard Starr, Claudia Winkler,** *Managing Editors*
J. Bottum, *Books & Arts Editor* **Matt Labash,** *Senior Writer* **Stephen F. Hayes,** *Staff Writer*
Victorino Matus, David Skinner, *Assistant Managing Editors* **Lee Bockhorn,** *Associate Editor* **Jonathan V. Last,** *Online Editor*
Katherine Mangu-Ward, *Reporter* **Rachel DiCarlo,** *Editorial Assistant*
Lev Nisnevitch, *Art Director* **Philip Chalk,** *Production Director*
Max Boot, Tucker Carlson, John J. DiIulio Jr., Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, Andrew Ferguson, David Frum, David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerecht
Brit Hume, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg, P. J. O'Rourke, John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer, *Contributing Editors*
Terry Eastland, *Publisher* **Peter Dunn,** *Advertising Director*
Nicholas H.B. Swezey, *Advertising & Marketing Manager* **Lauren Trotta Husted,** *Circulation Director*
Tina Winston, *Finance Director* **Catherine Titus Lowe,** *Publicity Director*
Taybor Cook, Carolyn Wimmer, *Executive Assistants* **Erin Montgomery,** *Staff Assistant*

the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the first week in January, the second week in July, the third week in August, and the first week in September) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-850-682-7653 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send manuscripts and letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, D.C. is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call Nicholas H.B. Swezey 1-202-496-3355. Copyright 2003, News America Incorporated. All rights reserved. No material in THE WEEKLY STANDARD may be reprinted without permission of the copyright owner. THE WEEKLY STANDARD is a trademark of News America Incorporated.

BPA INTERNATIONAL

www.weeklystandard.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reality Check

Until last week, the editors of the *New Republic* had distinguished themselves in the liberal camp as defenders (for the most part) of the Bush administration's Iraq policy. Now, following in the footsteps of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, they've declared that the White House engaged in a campaign of "misinformation" and "deceit." The administration, they claim, "systematically exaggerated" the Iraqi threat and so "has undermined democracy at home."

And what of the *New Republic*'s own past editorial support for removing Saddam? "This magazine's argument for war was different," they now insist. "It criticized the administration's unconvincing claims about Iraq's links to Al Qaeda and argued that, absent a clear terrorist link, it was Iraq's nuclear ambitions, not its biological and chemical stockpiles, that justified U.S. invasion."

You might think that a magazine would be authoritative on the subject of its own past editorial views. So you can imagine THE SCRAPBOOK's astonishment upon rereading the *New Republic*'s September 2, 2002, editorial, headlined "Best Case." That editorial in fact emphasized Iraq's use of chemical weapons, and stands as an honorable and persuasive statement of the case for war. The words are worth remembering today, even if the editors wish us to forget where they once stood:

"What is it, then, about the villain in Baghdad that should provoke the United States to rid the world of him? One spectacular thing: He is the only leader in the world with weapons of mass destruction who has used them. He used them against Iranian troops and against Kurdish civilians. This is what makes Saddam Hussein so distinguished in the field of evil. Morally and strategically, he lives in a post-deterrence world. We do not need to speculate about whether he would do the dirtiest deed. He has already done the dirtiest deed. That is the case, and 'the case.'

"Of course there are some who are not overly impressed by the moral and strategic ramifications of chemical warfare. Writing in the *Washington Post* this week, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that 'the frequently cited but essentially demagogic formula that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction (specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against either U.S. troops or Israel, both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter.' The implication here is that there is the rational gassing of innocents and the irrational gassing of innocents, and that Saddam Hussein practices only the rational gassing, and so we can deal with him.

"Brzezinski sleeps much too well. We would prefer to linger on this side of decency and to insist that the use of weapons of mass destruction denotes a general derangement. A man who actually employs these obscene devices, who regards them not with trepidation but instrumentally, is not a man who can be trusted to behave as the instructions of political science would have him behave. And it should not matter to us that these crimes were not committed against the United States, or that Saddam Hussein's missiles do not have the range to hit American places, because the use of weapons of mass destruction, rather like genocide, represents an international emergency. In international emergencies it is we who must lead. The physical defense of the United States includes also the moral defense of the United States; but the defense of American values sometimes requires action in non-American places. Democracy in the Middle East —in Riyadh, in Cairo, in Baghdad— would be splendid. But biological or chemical or nuclear war would be intolerable. If we do not prevent it, it is not least ourselves that we will have betrayed." ♦

Baghdad Begala

During the war in Iraq, THE SCRAPBOOK was struck by eerie similarities between Saddam Hussein's former information minister, Mohammed Sayeed Al-Sahhaf, aka Baghdad Bob, and Bill Clinton's still-serving information minister and co-host of CNN's *Crossfire*, Paul Begala. Both are from the nanny-nanny-boo-boo school of political discourse. Baghdad Bob once said of his opponents, the Americans, "They think we are retarded. *They* are retarded." Begala once noted of his opponents, when doing an electoral synopsis of red and blue America, that Texas is "the state where James Byrd was lynch-dragged behind a pickup truck until his body came apart—it's red." Both peevishly evade the tough questions. Baghdad Bob, when asked if Saddam was still alive, said, "I will only answer reasonable questions." Begala, when asked how he'd feel if Clinton admitted a relationship with Monica Lewinsky, shortly before he did, said, "I don't want to talk about my feelings. I just don't want to talk about my feelings. I just don't."

But let's not overdo the parallels. When Saddam fell, Baghdad Bob reportedly fled in shame and terror. When Begala's boss left office, he stayed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on TV and kept distorting reality on his behalf. Begala's June 6 *Crossfire* broadcast was a classic. Nobody else knows what happened to Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, but Begala has come up with a novel (read: psychotic) theory: Clinton destroyed them!

During an exchange with Republican consultant Ed Rogers, Rogers asked Begala: "So how close did you guys get? What happened in the Clinton White House?"

"This is what happened," responded Begala. "In 1998 [on the eve of the impeachment vote], President Clinton bombed every known or suspected weapons site. And that's why he didn't have them when we invaded in . . . 2003. That's what happened, isn't it?"

ROGERS: "No, not at all."

BEGALA: "We bombed them in '98, and the right wing said it was *Wag the Dog*. It turned out he actually destroyed all the weapons." Earth to Paul: Get help. As Baghdad Bob once said, "I now inform you that you are too far from reality." ♦

Hong Kong Update

Beijing is facing growing U.S. opposition to proposed new national security laws for Hong Kong. The new sedition laws—highlighted in these pages three weeks ago by Ellen Bork ("Severe Acute Tyranny Syndrome")—could be used to ban organizations or prosecute individuals for undefined acts of intimidation against the state. On June 19, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer pointedly noted that universal suffrage is "enshrined" in Hong Kong's constitution and the lack of movement "toward full participatory democracy" for Hong Kong was a concern. On Capitol Hill, Chris Cox, Nancy Pelosi, and Henry Hyde insist that all revisions of Hong Kong law should be undertaken by a fully democratic legislature, and they have called for immediate elections. In response, Beijing has told Washington to butt out, calling the decision a matter of "China's internal affairs."

No doubt, Chinese officials are also surprised. They haven't seen this much concern about Hong Kong since the stage-managed extravaganza of the handover of the former British colony to Beijing in 1997. Puzzled, a senior mainland official and former foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan recently asked "what's the meaning of Hong Kong's return" to mainland rule if the laws on subversion, sedition, and treason are not passed? Mr. Tang's question is worth considering. After all, China always planned to have control over Hong Kong, with a Beijing-appointed chief executive, an undemocratic legislature, and influence over key judicial decisions. For years, U.S. administrations accepted Beijing's blueprint and contorted themselves to square it with U.S. law—a law that conditions Hong Kong's special status for trade and other purposes on its autonomy from the mainland. The White House statement shows the Bush administration now recognizes that democracy is every bit as important in Hong Kong as it is everywhere else in the world. It's been slow coming, but, better late than never. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Casual

Grad Rules

I was the commencement speaker at my son Freddy's graduation from high school a few weeks ago. The night before, my daughter Grace informed me she remembered only one thing I'd said three years earlier when I delivered the address at her graduation. That was my advice to look for courses in college that don't require papers. I didn't ask if she has taken the advice, but I did feel chagrined that this was all she recalled.

Perhaps I should have been flattered that she recalled even this one nugget. That's one more than I remember from either my high school or college graduation and one more, I'd guess, than most people recall from theirs. Still, it was not encouraging to find out my remarks had been as superfluous as the lyrics in a rock song.

But then again, I hadn't been chosen to speak at my son's or my daughter's graduation because I'm a powerful orator or a great thinker. Perish the thought. Their school, St. Stephen's and St. Agnes in Alexandria, Virginia, has a wonderful tradition of having commencement speakers who both graduated from the school and have a kid in that year's class. I suspect I was the only person who qualified this year. They were stuck with me.

There's one rule for graduation speeches: Be brief. The time limit was 10 minutes, and I intended to honor it. There are also two seat-of-the-pants rules I have for such occasions: Be funny and don't embarrass yourself or your child who is graduating.

Funny isn't so hard since you can steal jokes. I've been milking one by Mort Zuckerman, publisher of *U.S. News & World Report*, for years. The occasion was a bachelor party for John McLaughlin, the TV show host, who was getting married for the second time. "John, your words will be remembered long after Shakespeare's are forgotten," Zuckerman said. He then added, "But not until then." The same would be true for my words, I told my son's graduating class.

Now, funny may be easy, but it's rare. I had laboriously checked out commencement speeches given by others for comments to pilfer. You'd be surprised how unfunny the vast majority of these addresses are. But not



the one I found by Al Franken, the crazy liberal comic. I was leery of using his joke, Franken not being my cup of tea. But my wife Barbara insisted it was very funny. I repeated it in my speech, giving Franken full credit.

"When I was first asked to speak at Hartford State Technical College, I jumped at the opportunity," Franken said. "Because, you see, I thought I had been asked to speak at Harvard, which would have been quite an honor. But instead, I am here with you, the nation's future air conditioning repairmen. Let's try to make the best of it." It turned out Barbara was right. The crowd was laughing before I reached the punch line.

I cited a few more excerpts from graduation speeches, then told the kids the bad news. Here I seized on political writer Mike Barone's brilliant insight about Soft America and Hard America. Kids up to 18 are pampered and shielded from the world's stormy blast by their parents. That's Soft America. But then they're parachuted into Hard America, where folks play for keeps. Oddly enough, Barone says, American kids grow up fast after 18 and become amazingly competent.

How much of this speech, you may be wondering, did I actually write myself? The answer is as little as possible.

Of course one also has to give advice in a commencement address. Here I shifted gears and went with some of my own material, most of it counterintuitive. Do sweat the small stuff, I said. Get the little things right and you'll be asked to do bigger things. And don't worry about keeping in touch with your friends. That'll happen naturally. But do pay attention to your friends' parents, who'll be able someday to give you internships, jobs, introductions, or letters of recommendation.

None of those got a rise, nor did my theory of college. Go to class, every class, I advised solemnly. And then you can scrape by even if, like many students, you don't study a lick or read any of the required books. Shamelessly, I swiped another bit of advice from my friend Brit Hume of Fox News. College students should be alert to the four big lies about studying: I'll get up early and study. I'll study over the weekend. I'll do the term paper over vacation. And we'll study together.

I got an early tipoff that my whole speech was soon to be forgotten, despite my best efforts. A number of students graciously said they liked it, but not one mentioned anything specific. Okay, okay, I shouldn't have expected anything more. I had, however, passed the first test of giving a good commencement speech. I had finished in 10 minutes.

Fred Barnes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNITING AGAINST SPAM

Spammers should start looking for another line of work.

Their exploitation of the Internet has spurred many people and organizations to team up in an unprecedented effort to stem the flood of unsolicited commercial e-mail that overwhelms inboxes, clogs networks, and costs businesses billions of dollars a year.

Microsoft, working with other technology leaders and with governments, is committed to curbing spam through technological innovation, industry efforts and legal action.

In terms of technological innovation, we are creating more advanced anti-spam tools. Building on work in our research labs, we are designing systems that grow smarter over time — to create spam filters that are more precise, easier to use, and more responsive to customers' preferences.

In April, we launched an anti-spam initiative with other industry leaders, including AOL, Yahoo!, and Earthlink. Together we are working to identify and restrict e-mail that conceals its source, as spam often does. And we are pooling information about known spammers, to prevent those who are shut down by one e-mail service from simply starting up with another.

We are working with industry and law enforcement agencies to develop and coordinate actions against deceptive and illegal spam. On June 16, Microsoft filed 15 lawsuits in the United States and the United Kingdom against companies and individuals alleged to be responsible for billions of spam messages sent in violation of state and federal laws.

Part of the challenge in curbing spam lies in distinguishing it from wanted e-mail. We are working with industry and consumer groups to develop guidelines for legitimate commercial e-mail — defining, for example, whether mail is legitimate based on a previous business relationship between the sender and recipient. A clear set of best practices will help responsible businesses to communicate with customers but avoid spamming.

Congress could provide a strong incentive for businesses to adopt e-mail best practices. We propose that an "ADV:" label, for advertisement, be required on all unsolicited commercial e-mail unless the sender comes within a regulatory "Safe Harbor." This would require compliance with certain e-mail guidelines, confirmed by a self-regulatory organization approved by the Federal Trade Commission.

Working together, we can curtail unwanted e-mail

Computer users could then customize their spam filters to either accept "ADV:"-labeled mail or automatically delete it. Consumers would regain control of their inboxes, and businesses would be encouraged to ensure that their communications are consistent with industry guidelines.

These and other efforts on many fronts should lead to a world where spam is no longer a constant nuisance that threatens to undermine e-mail's usefulness. As the financial rewards diminish and the penalties increase, spammers will be motivated to find other work — more constructive work, we hope.

One in a series of essays on technology and society. More information is available at microsoft.com/issues.

Microsoft®

© 2003 Microsoft Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spam, Spam, Spam . . .

When Christopher Caldwell refers to the decision to leave the Internet unregulated as "a serious, ideologically driven mistake" in "You've Got Spam" (June 16), he neglects to mention that the relevant ideology is conservatism. His article reads like the preprogrammed reaction of any liberal: Here's a problem, let's pass a law.

I have two e-mail accounts and receive essentially no spam, maybe because I'm careful about where I leave my addresses. Even if spammers figure out how to wiggle through spam blocker software, the next update will plug the hole. There is no need for Caldwell to become overwrought about this, or to adopt the environmentalists' tactic of darkly predicting "the end of the world as we know it" in an effort to advance legislative proposals.

But spam is (if you'll forgive the mixed metaphor) small potatoes. The remark in Caldwell's article that troubles me the most is the one suggesting that Internet sales ought to be taxed because it is "unfair" not to do so. If I want to read spurious arguments for new taxation, I can go to my daily newspaper; I hate to find them in The Weekly Standard. Caldwell should know that the rule against taxation of Internet sales merely reflects long-established constitutional law under the commerce clause, which disallows one state from taxing sales of goods sold by a catalog house in another state. The fact that the catalog is now online does not change the constitutional principle. Most states obligate the consumers in those transactions to report the sales and pay a use tax on the purchase, a requirement that consumers (including Caldwell, I bet) routinely ignore.

Leighton Anderson
Whittier, CA

One thing Christopher Caldwell's "You've Got Spam" fails to mention is that studies have consistently shown that 19 percent of all unsolicited e-mail is adult in nature. Much of this clearly violates existing federal obscenity laws. There are already laws making it illegal to transmit obscene material via an interactive computing device. As with most issues involving obscenity, the problem is not lack of law, but lack of enforcement. New laws may make a higher percentage of e-mail illegal, but they won't make much of an impact until the Department of Justice makes it a priority.

Daniel Weiss
Focus on the Family
Colorado Springs, CO

Radio Sawa's Serious Side

Joshua Muravchik's aim is true in his observation that we are again involved in a war of ideas ("America Loses Its Voice," June 9). His argument that victory in this war will not come from seduction—that it must be waged through persuasion—also hits the mark.



But the argument wobbles with its criticism of Radio Sawa, the U.S. international broadcasting effort to reach mass audiences in the Arabic-speaking world. True, we have succeeded in attracting a large number of listeners by offering them popular music. But it is equally true that between 15 and 20 percent of Radio Sawa's 24-hour broadcasts is devoted to news and interviews, as well as features that reflect Bush administration policy.

Indeed, one of the influential experts whom Radio Sawa journalists have interviewed is the distinguished Iraqi writer Kanan Makiya. Muravchik rightly agrees in his article that Makiya and other thoughtful writers should be given platforms to state their case on behalf of moderate Islam. As the chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I can vouch for the fact that we are doing this.

Other prominent figures who believe in the possibility of democracy in the Arab world and whom Sawa has interviewed recently include Fouad Ajami, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld. These interviews and others that we routinely conduct make radio a sharp instrument in the war of ideas. Later this year we will add a direct-to-home satellite Arabic television service to our radio and Internet services, and are confident that it will be a major escalation in the same war.

Muravchik is also squarely on target in his assessment of the resources required to rebuild our defense in the war of ideas. America's international broadcasters today face a large gulf between the increasing requirements of the post-9/11 world and the level of funding to which we sank during the nearly decade and a half after the end of the Cold War.

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson
Washington, DC

Effective FDA?

William Tucker's "I Want a New Drug" (June 16) effectively illustrated the looming danger of price controls in the pharmaceutical industry. However, the article was marred by a misinformed portrayal of the role of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). While FDA-required efficacy testing of experimental drugs is immensely expensive, the article suggested that such testing is unnecessary and that the process of FDA approval was "rapidly becoming obsolete." As an economic conservative and a scientist working within the pharmaceutical industry for Eli Lilly and Company, I understand the impulse to view FDA regulations as an impediment to progress. However, I believe this is one instance where regulations have actually assisted medical advancement.

In fact, FDA-required efficacy testing has been a tremendous boon to patients, ensuring a level of quality of new medicines that would not have been reached without such regulations. Viewing this industry from within, I can guarantee that without the FDA requirements, inferior treatments would flood the medical mar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ketplace. Furthermore, most practicing physicians are ill equipped to understand the subtleties of efficacy research, and many would prescribe new treatments without adequate evidence of effectiveness. Indeed, this outcome is illustrated today with widespread "off-label" prescriptions, many based on little or no evidence substantiating such usage. Existing FDA regulations provide only a minimal safeguard that the medicine your doctor prescribes is safe and effective.

Finally, Tucker argues that patients are increasingly unwilling to participate in efficacy studies. This is absolutely false, as the number of patients participating in trials has continued to increase. Tucker uses the bogus example of a patient dying of cancer not wanting to take the chance of receiving only a placebo. In fact, all cancer trials today use standard effective treatments—not placebos—as controls in efficacy trials. Patients continue to enthusiastically participate in clinical trials because in many cases a clinical trial will ensure the highest overall care the patient can possibly receive. There is simply no truth to Tucker's claim that the efficacy testing process is "becoming obsolete."

PATRICK PETERSON
Versailles, KY

HONG KONG SECURITY

THE ARTICLE "Severe Acute Tyranny Syndrome" by Ellen Bork (June 9) contains serious misconceptions about the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's proposals to implement our constitutional duty under the Basic Law to protect national security.

Our National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill is in full accord with the "one country, two systems" principle, and there is no question of extending mainland laws to Hong Kong. The bill has proposed that all its provisions must be interpreted, applied, and enforced in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Basic Law, which provides constitutional guarantees on fundamental rights and freedoms. The way of life, rights, and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong people will not be affected by our proposed national security law.

JACQUELINE A. WILLIS
Hong Kong Commissioner, USA
Washington, DC

U.S. AND E.U.

IT IS TRUE THAT EUROPEAN HOSTILITY to the war in Iraq was broadly based, as Max Boot suggests in "Continental Divide" (June 9). However, this fact needs to be viewed in light of two other considerations.

First, the opposition was inchoate—apart from a general feeling that war was a bad thing, the various groups of protesters had almost nothing in common. This is why they were unable to come up with a coherent alternative agenda and ultimately posed no serious challenge to political leaders in Europe who decided to ignore them.

Second, the opposition to the war was shallow. In those countries that have held elections during the period of the Iraq crisis there is no indication that people considered the war such a defining issue that it changed their voting patterns.

While Boot is right to point out that in Germany the Christian Democratic Union's attitude was cautious, the party did not jump on the antiwar bandwagon, and it did criticize Schröder's handling of the dispute. However, this did not translate into punishment at the polls. In the state elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony on February 2, 2003, the CDU increased their share of the vote by 5.4 percentage points in the former and 12.4 percentage points in the latter. Schröder's socialists dropped by 10.3 percentage points and 14.5 percentage points respectively.

In the U.K., regional elections were held in Scotland and Wales, and local government elections were held in England. The main antiwar party—the Liberal Democrats—failed to gain any seats in either Wales or Scotland, and while Blair's Labour party lost heavily in the local elections in England, it lost to the equally pro-war Conservative party.

In Spain the local elections of May 25 resulted in only a small drop in the vote for Prime Minister Aznar's Popular party—33.9 percent as opposed to the Socialists' 34.7 percent—not a bad result for a prime minister in power for seven years. These results contradict the dire predictions of a collapse in support for him as punishment for his support of the coalition.

In Australia, Prime Minister John Howard's Liberal party held its ground in the New South Wales state election with 24.94 percent of the vote—marginally up from the first time.

Opinion polls can tell us only so much—elections tell us a lot more. The election results across Europe and in Australia indicate that while people did not like the war, their hostility did not result in a political sea change in European attitudes or E.U.-U.S. relations.

While Boot is right to insist that the United States still has an important interest in the shape of Europe, the challenge to the United States is less significant than some think and the difficulties less profound than is often stated. Like many commentators on this issue, Boot fails to consider the implications of the wider Middle East situation on European attitudes. Juvenile cries of anti-Semitism from some American commentators will not change the fact that the Palestine/Israel issue will continue to poison E.U.-U.S. relationships until some resolution of that conflict takes place. The current process, if successful, could also facilitate a significant, positive development in the relationship between the E.U. and the U.S.

ALWYN THOMSON
Belfast, Northern Ireland

COMPOSER CONFUSION

UNLESS THERE ARE two contemporary composers named Frank Martin, "the sublime choral works of American composer Frank Martin" that Lee Bockhorn (THE STANDARD READER, June 16) believes deserve great exposure were actually written by the Swiss composer Frank Martin (1890-1974).

JEROME S. SHIPMAN
Potomac, MD

• • •

THE WEEKLY STANDARD
welcomes letters to the editor.
All letters should be addressed:
Correspondence Editor
THE WEEKLY STANDARD
1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505
Washington, DC 20036.

You may also fax letters: (202) 293-4901
or e-mail: editor@weeklystandard.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



WE WANT THE TRUTH NOW.

America rallied around a President who warned of the imminent danger of weapons of mass destruction, who promised the evidence for such weapons was incontrovertible. Now, months later, no weapons have been found. Worse, the evidence suggests that intelligence reports were deliberately misread, that the American people were deliberately misled. It would be a tragedy if young men and women were sent to die for a lie.

☐ YES! I want the truth.

Your contribution will help fund additional efforts to tell the real story behind the headlines.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

E-MAIL ADDRESS

Make checks payable to MoveOn.org. Mail to MoveOn.org, 336 Bon Air Center #354, Greenbrae, CA 94904. Contributions to MoveOn.org are not tax deductible.

MoveOn.ORG

Win Without War

CALL YOUR REPRESENTATIVE AND SENATORS NOW AND DEMAND AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO DETERMINE THE TRUTH.

This ad is paid for by TomPaine.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the weekly Standard

John Ashcroft's Lazy Critics

Early last week, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals here in Washington, refereeing yet another legal skirmish over the civil liberties implications of Bush administration anti-terrorism policy, handed down yet another ruling favorable to the government. This is what usually happens: With fewer exceptions than you can count on the fingers of one hand, the Justice Department has prevailed in every such lawsuit—there've been dozens—since the World Trade Center was destroyed. This most recent decision has occasioned a fair bit of agonized hair-pulling in certain circles, which is also what usually happens. Rapidly growing bald, the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, one of roughly two dozen plaintiffs in the latest case, calls the D.C. Circuit's majority opinion "unprecedented" and "odious."

And this magazine is disappointed, too, as we usually are—though not because we think it clear that the court's verdict will harm the common weal. As a matter of fact, we have no firmer view today on the merits of the underlying policy at issue than we did back in December 2001, when the ink on that policy was not yet dry and the suit was first filed. And that's the disappointment: unresolved confusion. Which is a more obvious and chronic—one might even say "odious"—"security vs. liberty" problem in the war on terrorism than any rights-encroaching depredation the ACLU has so far persuasively alleged against the government. In this respect, as well, *Center for National Security Studies, et al.* v. *U.S. Department of Justice* is just the usual, tired business, the same old warmed-over argument about whether Attorney General John Ashcroft is supervising an anti-constitutional police-state regime. That argument has been singularly unilluminating—stupid, even—from the very start.

In October 2001, by means of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, an outfit called the Center for National Security Studies demanded that the Justice Department hand over a large chunk of individualized data about any and all persons "arrested or detained" in connection with the 9/11 investigation: their names, what charges had been lodged against them, where they were being held, and so forth. Some of the requested information was already publicly available in one form or another, and some of the rest Justice soon saw fit to release. But the department declined to provide full, case-specific details about those detainees being held for criminal or immigration violations. And about those detainees being held on "material witness" warrants, Justice declined to say anything specific at all. Thus rebuffed, the Center for National Security Studies—joined by a broad coalition of civil liberties and human rights watchdog organizations, Arab and Muslim advocacy groups, criminal defense and immigration attorneys, and other critics of the government's terror-related law-enforcement programs—then filed suit in federal district court. The government was defying its statutory FOIA responsibilities, the plaintiffs claimed—and was trampling the First Amendment in the bargain.

This latter claim was not a serious one, and neither the district court nor even the eventual circuit court dissenter, Judge David Tatel, paid it much mind. The Constitution protects public access to a variety of criminal proceedings and documents, but only those involving a defendant who's already been indicted. Pre-indictment announcements about that defendant's law-enforcement status are discretionary; the government, the Supreme Court explained as recently as 1999, "could decide not to give out arrestee information"—of any kind—"without violating the First Amendment."

But whether, short of the Constitution, there might be some *statutory* enactment that obliges the government to give out arrestee and similar information is another question altogether. And the particular version of that question presented in the case at hand—whether FOIA obliges the Justice Department to make public a complete and detailed accounting of its September 11 detainees—is an ambiguous one, the answer dependent, according to the law's plain terms, on a subjective judgment about what could "reasonably be expected" to result from release of the information. Not every subjective judgment is the same, of course. Some are intelligent, and others are ill-informed and arbitrary. And here, one might have hoped that the *Center for National Security Studies* litigation would cast some clarifying light on which is which. But one's hopes would only have been dashed.

Responding to the lawsuit, Justice Department attorneys have consistently argued that FOIA's "Exemption 7"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

positively *prohibits* the government from publicizing the detainee information under dispute. Exemption 7 precludes disclosure of information "compiled for law enforcement purposes" that could "reasonably be expected," for example, "to interfere with enforcement proceedings," "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," or "endanger the life or physical safety of any individual." Release of systematic data about the 9/11 detainees, the argument continues, would likely do all of these things: It would provide al Qaeda with a "mosaic" road map of the government's investigative techniques and progress, unfairly besmirch the reputations of those detainees who are entirely innocent of wrongdoing, deter other detainees from candidly cooperating with the FBI, and subject all the detainees—as presumed informants—to the risk of terrorist retaliation.

In rebuttal, however, the *Center for National Security Studies* plaintiffs have called attention to some apparent logical inconsistencies in the Justice Department's consistently argued theory—at least where real-world applications are concerned. As mandated by both statute and the Constitution, Justice has itself already disclosed the names of more than a hundred detainees charged with federal crimes. And though each of these defendants is innocent until proven guilty, Justice has released this information without complaint, and sometimes with considerable enthusiasm, concern for private reputations and "mosaic" road maps notwithstanding. Justice has withheld, on the other hand, all citizenship-status data about these criminal defendants—while publicizing the very same information about its 700-plus immigration detainees, whom the department has nevertheless declined to name, even while acknowledging that the vast majority of them have proved to have no 9/11 connection whatsoever. Moreover, the Justice Department has made no effort to deter any of its detainees from going public about their detentions unilaterally. Why doesn't *that* threaten to "interfere with enforcement proceedings"? And if it doesn't, how could identical disclosures by the government be forbidden by FOIA?

The lawsuit proceeds from an assumption that the U.S. government has lately transformed itself into a quasi-fascist enterprise.

These are details, it must be admitted, that our government's explanatory submissions to the district and appeals courts do not waste much sweat on. The department has its reasons, Justice's attorneys offer. In the considered judgment of experienced, career anti-terrorism experts, that information which has already and inconsistently been made available is relatively harmless, and that information which remains inconsistently withheld would represent a significant gift to Osama bin Laden.

Which may be true. And it may be, too, as we have sometimes previously suggested, that precise public argument just isn't the Ashcroft Justice Department's strong suit.

Or it may be, simply and instead, that anybody's Justice Department would naturally be inclined to give the stiff-arm to a lawsuit, like this one, that proceeds from an assumption that the United States government has lately transformed itself into a quasi-fascist enterprise.

The *Center for National Security Studies* plaintiffs—hyperbolically, absurdly, and with multiple inconsistencies all their own—contend that there are "extensive" and "credible" reports that federal officials have detained hundreds of people in "secret confinement," and subjected them to "widespread abuse," physical and otherwise, based only on the fact that they share "the ethnic background, religion, or national origin of the September 11 hijackers." The government's "mosaic" road-map fig-leaf theory must be rejected, plaintiffs insist—so that they may obtain the evidence necessary to construct . . . well, a "mosaic" road map of the detention policy, a means by which to substantiate that policy's suspected "lawless roundup." And to vindicate the rights of that roundup's victims, their names must be made public—if need be, against their wills.

Granted, the plaintiffs concede, it's always a remote possibility that the detainees aren't "lawless roundup" victims at all, but rather the subjects of a legitimate, "focused law enforcement investigation." Still, we've got this mountain of Ashcroft-is-a-Nazi newspaper clippings, see. Which represents a sufficiently "compelling" indication that the government is out of control. Which means that the courts must pry loose from confidential Justice Department files, and deliver unto the *New York Times*, an enormous collection of information that career prosecutors are warning will compromise the integrity of a massive criminal investigation into an unprecedented act of mass murder.

We're pretty sure this isn't the right way to settle disclosure policy about American anti-terrorism programs. And so we're not especially surprised that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, forced to choose between such a self-evidently crackpot, speculative "all," on the one hand, and the Justice Department's "nothing" on the other, has chosen to go with Justice. What if the right answer lies somewhere in the middle, though: How would we, or the courts, or anybody else be able to tell? We'd first need to hear from Justice Department critics prepared to engage such questions in good faith, with abundant care for the facts, and without hysterical hostility to the people who currently populate the executive branch. The war on terrorism's almost two years old. Where on earth are these necessary critics, anyhow?

—David Tell, for the Editors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The War Against Bush

They were split over Saddam, but Democrats are united against the president. BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

GIVE JOHN KERRY CREDIT. It takes guts to accuse someone of lying when that someone has said essentially what you have been saying for a decade. Which is what John Kerry did last week when he told a gathering of antiwar Democrats in New Hampshire that President George W. Bush "misled every one of us" in making the case for war in Iraq. Kerry called for a full investigation—a rather peculiar request from someone who sounds so certain about its outcome.

Kerry isn't alone. More and more Democrats are going the way of the French. Or, to put it differently, they're following in the footsteps of Rep. Jim McDermott. Visiting Baghdad last fall, the Seattle Democrat urged the world to "take the Iraqis on their face value" but gave no such benefit of the doubt to President Bush: "The president of the United States will lie to the American people in order to get us into this war." This was extreme at the time. Eight months later, it's virtually the mainstream Democratic view.

Kerry of course supported regime change in Iraq for years, articulated the seriousness of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein on numerous occasions, and voted for the resolution on Iraq last fall. He even sponsored a 1998 resolution authorizing the president to "take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs." But that was President Clinton.

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Kerry's opportunistic move to the left coincides with a reversal on the part of the previously hawkish *New Republic*, which features on the cover of its current issue an article by Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The First Casualty: the Selling of the Iraq War."

"Three months after the invasion," they write,

> the United States may yet discover the chemical and biological weapons that various governments and the United Nations have long believed Iraq possessed. But it is unlikely to find, as the Bush administration had repeatedly predicted, a reconstituted nuclear weapons program or evidence of joint exercises with Al Qaeda—the two most compelling security arguments for war. Whatever is found, what matters as far as American democracy is concerned is whether the administration gave Americans an honest and accurate account of what it knew. The evidence to date is that it did not, and the cost to U.S. democracy could be felt for years to come.

Dishonest and inaccurate, they argue, and that's just for starters. President Bush "has engaged in a pattern of deception concerning the most fundamental decisions a government must make. The United States may have been justified in going to war in Iraq—there were, after all, other rationales for doing so—but it was not justified in doing so on the national security grounds that President Bush put forth."

Let's take those charges—the "two most compelling security arguments for war"—one at a time. First, "evi-



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence of joint exercises" with al Qaeda —a novel formulation that raises the bar well above the "links" or evidence of cooperation that top Bush administration officials usually cited. But that aside, Ackerman and Judis focus their analysis of the Saddam-al Qaeda relationship on the alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in April 2001. They write: "None of the intelligence agencies could place Atta in Prague on that date. (Indeed, receipts and other travel documents placed him in the United States.) An investigation by Czech officials dismissed the claim, which was based on a single unreliable witness."

But there are times Atta may have been abroad that are not accounted for in these documents and receipts. And assessments of the reliability of the witness vary, with some high-ranking Czech officials insisting to this day that the meeting took place. It's fair to say the alleged Atta meeting was disputed, but it's hardly accurate to imply that officials were unanimous in their belief that it didn't happen.

In addition to the Atta story, Ackerman and Judis write, "the CIA was also receiving other information that rebutted a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda." The evidence? Captured al Qaeda terrorists told them there was no connection.

The authors and the administration critics they interviewed are also troubled by the fact that Vice President Cheney traveled several times to the CIA to review data himself, and by the establishment of a Pentagon-based intelligence team to review old intel about Iraq-al Qaeda connections.

The Cheney trips, according to Ackerman and Judis, "were understood within the agency as an attempt to pressure the low-level specialists interpreting the raw intelligence. 'That would freak people out,' says one former CIA official. 'It is supposed to be an ivory tower.'" Really? Here as elsewhere Ackerman and Judis betray limitless credulousness in the face of claims by "former CIA officials" who agree with them on policy. They refuse to entertain the possibility that the vice president of a country about to embark on war might want to be as thoroughly briefed as possible. Similarly, why would a special task force to review al Qaeda-Iraq links be such a bad idea? Can it really be the position of the administration's critics that the executive branch is to defer uncritically to CIA analysis?

And that's it. A still-disputed Mohammed Atta meeting, denials from terrorists, trips to the CIA, and a special intelligence review team—with that, Ackerman and Judis accuse the Bush administration of deception, of "constructing castles out of sand." And though George Tenet, a Clinton administration holdover and veteran Democratic staffer with the Senate intelligence committee, wrote of "solid reporting of senior-level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade," Ackerman and Judis dismiss this as "a sop to the administration."

There is no question that some CIA analysts—perhaps even most CIA analysts—were skeptical about connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. But other intelligence experts disagreed, and events and findings since the war's end would seem to make those links at least an open question. But not to the critics—they know better.

There are several interesting reports of Iraq-al Qaeda links that the critics ignore. Farouk Hijazi, former Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, long believed to be the liaison between Iraq and al Qaeda, was captured a month ago. Administration officials told *Newsweek* that Hijazi admitted meeting with Osama bin Laden in Sudan in the mid-1990s, confirming previous intelligence reports. So terrorists who deny links with Iraq are more believable than Hijazi?

A mid-level associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an al Qaeda leader specializing in biological and chemical weapons, was captured in Baghdad shortly after the war. Al-Zarqawi, who also has ties to an al Qaeda splinter group, Ansar al-Islam, which operated in Kurdish-controlled Iraq, fled to Baghdad and received medical treatment after he was wounded fighting in Afghanistan. Colin Powell, in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, spoke of al-Zarqawi and intelligence that he was operating a small cell from Baghdad. U.S. intelligence officials believe he remained in Baghdad as the war in Iraq began in mid-March, and may have fled to Iran following the conflict. On June 11, 2003, Knight-Ridder reporters revealed that U.S. troops in Baghdad captured "several suspected associates of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi" and "suspected members of Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamic extremist group."

Ackerman and Judis also focus on the administration's case on nukes, which they argue was at least hyped, and perhaps dishonest. The "misinformation and exaggeration" culminated in a speech President Bush gave in Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 7. Said Bush: "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program." He further asserted, "Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."

Studies conducted by both the CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) provided the basis for this assertion. Both agencies stand by that analysis today. But Ackerman and Judis point to studies of the tubes conducted by teams at the Department of Energy and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Those studies concluded that such tubes are not a good fit for gas centrifuges. So there was not unanimity. Why administration critics who are eager to defer to the CIA's skepticism about Saddam's al Qaeda links would rather not believe the CIA about the aluminum tubes is not explained. What's more, at least one foreign intelligence service has conducted its own tests on the tubes, and concluded that they are compatible with use in gas centrifuges.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ackerman and Judis are also indignant that Bush warned in Cincinnati that Iraq was developing a fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could disperse chemical or biological weapons, adding that the administration was "concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." Ackerman and Judis assert: "This claim represented the height of absurdity. Iraq's UAVs had ranges of, at most, 300 miles. They could not make the flight from Baghdad to Tel Aviv, let alone to New York." Of course, Bush nowhere suggested that these UAVs would be launched from Iraqi soil. In addition, terrorist groups are known to have investigated the potential of UAVs, which could be moved offshore, or even into the United States.

Ackerman and Judis also go after Vice President Cheney's assertion, in a March 16, 2003, appearance on *Meet the Press*, that Saddam Hussein "has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." Indeed, the *New Republic* authors say that Bush administration officials made that claim "repeatedly." Here, it seems likely that Cheney misspoke. He presumably meant to echo President Bush, who had said that there was evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear *program*. At least three other times in the same interview—never cited in the *New Republic* piece—Cheney was clear the worry about nuclear weapons was in the future. Said Cheney: "There's no question about who is going to prevail if there is military action. And there's no question but what is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will be to wait a year or two years or three years until he's developed even more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons." Some deception.

The most serious allegation, and also the murkiest, involves the erroneous assertion in the president's State of the Union address that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from sources in Niger. The claim was based on forged documents. What's not clear is whether anyone in the know about the forgery also had a hand in the speech. Obviously if this was the case someone should be fired.

The bottom line for Ackerman, Judis, and other administration critics: "There was no consensus within the American intelligence community that Saddam represented such a grave and imminent threat."



John Kerry

But intelligence is an art, of course, not a science. It often yields different interpretations, and the country depends on experienced policymakers like Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld to choose among those interpretations. Sometimes a CIA analysis might seem particularly persuasive, other times CIA analyses might seem thin or overwrought. But choosing a mistaken intelligence read or relying on bad intelligence—and it's far too early to determine if that happened in Iraq—is not the same as lying.

What's more, the intelligence community "consensus" on Iraq has often been deeply flawed.

There was consensus within the American intelligence community that Saddam Hussein would not start a war with Iran in 1980. He did. There was consensus within the American intelligence community ten years later that Saddam Hussein would not invade Kuwait. He did. There was a consensus that Saddam Hussein would not have a nuclear weapon for several years. We learned after the Gulf War ended that he had been just a year away from acquiring one. There was a consensus within the American intelligence community that Saddam Hussein, having been "contained" by U.N. weapons inspectors, would not attempt to avenge his humiliating 1991 defeat. He did, with the attempted assassination of former President Bush 18 months later. There was consensus within the American intelligence community that a secular Saddam would never reach out to Islamic fundamentalists. He did.

In sum: Emphasizing alarming evidence, considering the most dangerous possibilities, outlining the most terrifying threats—all of this is quite different from lying to get the nation to go to war. After September 11, it might better be described as prudent. As in any preventive war, the imminence of Saddam Hussein's threat was always going to be a matter of some uncertainty. But in a world where Americans are killed by terrorists crashing airplanes into buildings and anthrax comes in the mail and bombs come in shoes—ignoring grave threats because we cannot be sure they are absolutely imminent would seem to be a risky course of action. Yet it also seems to be the position the Democratic party is moving to embrace. ♦

Illustration by Earl Keleny

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia

Dubious allies in the war on terror.

BY MATTHEW A. LEVITT

EARLIER THIS MONTH, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency announced new rules governing Saudi charities and welfare agencies. From now on, each charity must consolidate its funds in a single bank account licensed by the government, from which cash withdrawals are banned. Explaining the new rules in Washington, Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan declared with finality, "We have closed the door on the possibility for charitable giving to be misappropriated for illegal purposes."

Matthew A. Levitt, a former FBI counterterrorism analyst, is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Perhaps al Qaeda's four coordinated suicide bombings in Riyadh on May 12 really did deliver "a massive jolt" to the regime, as one Saudi insisted. The official rhetoric, at least, expressed resolve. The day after the bombings, Crown Prince Abdullah called the attackers "vicious animals whose only concern is to shed blood and bring terror to those innocents." Days later, his foreign policy adviser Adel al Jubeir reiterated that the government will do everything necessary "to confront and destroy the organization and the people who did this." Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal went so far as to say that combating terror requires "standing up to whoever feeds it and sympathizes with it."

Not only that, but the *Chicago Tribune* reported on June 20 that Saudi authorities were about to arrest at least one "prominent Saudi businessman" and seize his assets for financing the al Qaeda cells behind the May 12 attacks. It seems the plotters had plans to assassinate members of the royal family. Can it be, then, that the Saudis have turned a corner on the financing of extremism? Will they now really become full partners in the war on terror, assisting international investigations, following the money trail, and curbing incitement?

Not likely. Even as Saudi security forces crack down hard on terrorists who threaten the kingdom, the government's efforts fall far short of full-fledged cooperation in the effort to stop this global scourge.

To be sure, the Saudis reacted swiftly to the May 12 bombings, which took 34 lives. They conducted sweeps of apartment complexes, arrested terrorists, even detained some radical preachers. Similar crackdowns, however, followed the 1995 attack on the Saudi National Guard office and the 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Since September 11, the Saudis have provided intelligence that has helped prevent attacks on U.S. forces stationed in the region. Saudi agents reportedly infiltrated two domestic al Qaeda cells, leading to the arrest last summer of over 75 al Qaeda members, of various nationalities. Saudi security services also thwarted several plots targeting Western interests in the kingdom. But these were merely tactical operations. The royal family has a history of cutting off investigations whenever the trail leads anywhere near Saudi elites and so threatens to expose fault lines in Saudi society.

Thus, Saudi officials spoke of the men behind the Riyadh attacks as a "small group" of "criminals"—refusing to recognize them as part of the international matrix of terrorism.

"WHITE HOUSE LISTENS WHEN WEEKLY SPEAKS"

The New York Times

Read The Daily Standard . . . daily. Only on the web. weeklystandard.com

the weekly Standard



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Riyadh cells were originally commanded by Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, a senior al Qaeda figure, tied to the bombing of the USS *Cole*, who was captured in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. His deputy, Khaled Jehani, took over the cells' operations, with the help of Ali Abdel Rahman al Ghamdi, Abdurahman Mansour Jabarah, and other well-known al Qaeda operatives.

Far from being a transformative event, the Riyadh bombings elicited the standard Saudi response to such unpleasant developments. Every few months, the Saudis announce new restrictions on charities or launch another PR campaign in the United States—but they change their behavior only in response to insistent demands from outside.

Thus, shortly after the last tightening of financial regulations, Sheikh Aqeel al-Aqeel, head of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, denied funding terrorist groups and proudly asserted that the decision to close several foreign branch offices had nothing to do with U.S. pressure. In reality, the offices were shut because the Saudi government had frozen their funds—after German officials had linked the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation to terrorist activity in Berlin, and two senior U.S. officials had gone to Saudi Arabia armed with U.S. intelligence tying the foundation to current terrorist activity. Similarly, the Saudis extradited the German Islamist Christian Ganczarski—described by French officials as "a high-ranking member of al Qaeda who has been in contact with Osama bin Laden himself"—to France on June 3 only after international pressure was applied.

Meanwhile, an abundance of evidence confirms that financial and moral support for terrorism are still flowing from the kingdom.

¶ On May 6, Saudi police raided a safehouse in Riyadh and discovered a weapons cache and hundreds of pounds of explosives, though the terrorists got away. A State Department cable from the U.S. consulate in Jeddah offered a sampling of the following Friday's sermons. One called for the "destruction of the Jews and the Americans." At the al-Hessy Mosque in Riyadh, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman followed similar remarks with the announcement that officials from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs would be waiting outside with collection boxes. The sheikh encouraged worshippers to give freely to the officials "as they are trustworthy." (Several months after the September 11 attacks, the head of this "trustworthy" ministry, Sheikh Saleh Abdul Aziz Mohammed al Sheik, told a

THE Public Interest

"The Public Interest *is simply the nation's best domestic policy journal.*"
— David Brooks

SUMMER 2003

A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism
James W. Ceaser

***David Boyum & Mark A. R. Kleiman* on the drug-crime link**
***Adam Wolfson* on MLK • *Charles Murray* on measuring achievement**
***Naomi Schaefer* on religious colleges • *David L. Kirp* on education for profit**
***James Q. Wilson* on Daniel Patrick Moynihan**

Book Reviews by *Nathan Glazer, Joel Schwartz, Daniel J. Mahoney Jean Bethke Elshtain, Lawrence M. Mead*

Name _____
Address _____
_____

To subscribe call 888/267-6030
Or write to us at:
1112 16th Street, N.W., Suite 140
Washington, D.C. 20036

Subscriptions: $25.00 per year (4 issues), $42.50 for two years

WS0603

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gathering of religious leaders in Malaysia that "suicide bombings are permitted" and bombers "are considered to have died a martyr's death.")

¶ International investigations continue to tie Saudi charities to terrorist activity the world over. A long list of Islamic extremists have been linked to the Saudi-funded al Nur Mosque in Berlin. One of them, Tunisian al Qaeda associate Ihsan Garnoaui, was believed to have been plotting an attack in Berlin. Muhammad Fakihi, chief of the Saudi embassy's Islamic Affairs Section in Berlin, confessed to doling out embassy funds according to the instructions of "close friends" of bin Laden.

¶ In May, Saudi diplomat Fahad al Thumairy was denied reentry into the United States for his links to terrorism. Like Fakihi in Berlin, Thumairy worked in the Islamic and Cultural Affairs section, this time at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles.

¶ Around the same time, Mauritanian officials carried out a series of arrests of Islamists. One group, which included religious leaders, was accused of "recruitment" and "subversive scheming." On May 27, at least 10 teachers at the Saudi-funded Arab and Saudi Islamic Institute in the capital, Nouakchott, were arrested. A total of 36 people were charged with "plotting against the constitutional order" and other offenses.

¶ On May 28, Cambodia charged 3 men—2 Thais and an Egyptian—with being members of the Jemaah Islamiyah and having links to al Qaeda, and prepared to deport another 50 Arab and African Islamists. Twenty-eight of the suspects were Islamic teachers associated with a Saudi-funded school. Prime Minister Hun Sen presided at a press conference announcing that his government's "investigation proves this group has received financial support from international terrorist groups. The funding mainly came out of Saudi Arabia." A few days later, 4 more Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists tied to the Cambodian network were arrested in Thailand, where they were reportedly plotting to bomb the American, British, Australian, and Singaporean embassies.



Reuters

Crown Prince Abdullah tours the compound bombed by terrorists on May 13, 2003.

None of this, of course, is new. A recently disclosed 1996 CIA document shows that as early as 1994 Washington was warning that in 1992 Saudi nationals gave some $150 million to Islamic charities active in Bosnia and implicated in terrorism. Similarly, computer files uncovered in the March 2002 raids on the Benevolence International Foundation in Bosnia revealed a 1988 al Qaeda memorandum listing 20 Saudi financial backers described by bin Laden as "the Golden Chain." But neither did Saudi support for terror cease after 9/11. The *Los Angeles Times* recently published some extremely interesting Italian intelligence wiretaps. One captures a senior al Qaeda recruiter in Europe telling the Egyptian imam of the Via Quaranta mosque in Milan not to worry about funding because "Saudi Arabia's money is your money." That was in June 2002.

It mystifies the American mind that such activity continues, even in the face of so many murders. Surely what the world has learned about international terrorism since September 11 must cause the Saudis to question their tradition of tolerating extremism and facilitating terror—mustn't it?

Only to a limited extent, and here's the reason. Two pillars uphold the Saudi regime. One of them—the social contract by which the House of Saud provides education, health care, jobs, and other basic necessities at little or no cost and in return is granted complete political discretion in the kingdom—is no longer economically tenable. So Riyadh is that much more dependent for its legitimacy on the second pillar, the political-religious contract struck between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi clerical elite.

The Wahhabi clerics, of course, espouse a fundamentalist variant of Islam that is strongly supportive of al Qaeda's message. The Saudi regime will not curb the financing of extremist groups or the incitement and hatred pervasive in its educational system as long as the royal family bows before these masters. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Get 300 Issues FREE

If you're a subscriber...don't miss out!

Make sure you're a registered subscriber—and you'll see what you've been missing!

It takes just a few seconds. Just go to weeklystandard.com and you'll immediately see how easy it is. All you'll need to do is choose a password.

Once you're registered, you'll be able to read each issue of the magazine in an Adobe PDF format. You can also read individual magazine articles in text format. And you can browse back issues of The Weekly Standard—more than 300 of them! All are in our online archive.

Register now...GO to weeklystandard.com

the weekly Standard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not a Leap of Faith

The empirical case for faith-based social services.

BY JOHN J. DIIULIO JR.

IN RECENT YEARS there has been an explosion in empirical research on faith-based social programs. Most studies, including the most scientifically rigorous, find that faith moves social and civic mountains. Last year, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania released a report identifying over 500 scientifically sound studies in which the "faith factor" was associated with results ranging from reductions in hypertension, depression, and suicide to lower rates of drug abuse, educational failure, nonmarital teenage childbearing, and criminal behavior.

Consider the latest scientific literature on religion and crime. With all due qualifications and caveats, some 50 empirical studies report that religious influences and institutions reduce violence and delinquency. Consider, for example, the work of my Penn colleague Byron Johnson, director of the Center for Research on Religion and Urban Civil Society (CRRUCS). In a 1997 *Justice Quarterly* study, he reported that New York state prisoners who participated intensively in Bible studies administered by Prison Fellowship ministries (on whose board I once served) were only a third as likely to be arrested a year after release as otherwise comparable prisoners who did not participate. In a forthcoming follow-up study, he finds that, on average, eight years after release, the Bible studies participants remained arrest-free over 50 percent longer than the parolees in the comparison group.

Likewise, in a just-released six-year study of a faith-based program in a Texas prison run by Prison Fellowship, Johnson reports that, two years after release, inmates who completed the 22-month program (16 months in prison plus 6 months of post-release care) were less likely to be rearrested than inmates paroled early from the program and than otherwise comparable inmates who did not participate in the program.

Indeed, only 8 percent of the Prison Fellowship program graduates, versus 20 percent of the matched comparison group, were incarcerated within two years after being released. Equally striking were the prisoners' own words concerning how the program effected rehabilitation by proclaiming God's love, fostering spiritual growth, and stressing the need to give back to society. Typical was the comment by one prisoner that he had "learned what life is about since being here . . . life is about helping others to grow like I'm growing. . . . I saw that other people loved me. Then I wanted to do the same."

As Johnson's report stressed, more research is sorely needed. And yet scores of studies now find that religious influences and institutions are especially beneficial in the lives of America's most truly disadvantaged children and youth. These studies tell of schooling success among low-income Latino youth; improved employment prospects for low-income African-American youth; rapid gains in reading ability among urban elementary school students; cost-effective delinquency prevention services; the mobilization of year-round mentors for prisoners' children; and much else as well.

For instance, a 4-year, 16-city study released in 2002 and 2003 by Public/Private Ventures, a nonprofit research organization in Philadelphia on whose board I serve, documents that faith-based organizations promote effective delivery of employment, education, and other justice system services to high-risk youth and adjudicated young adults. Another recent Public/Private Ventures study found that when churches partnered with public schools to provide quality after-school reading programs to some 900 children who were reading two or more years below grade level, the improvements were dramatic: After about 100 days, younger children vaulted 1.9 years in reading ability, and high school pupils gained a year.

So, whether with respect to reducing recidivism rates, improving public health outcomes, accelerating volunteer mobilization, or other objective measures, the empirical evidence has become weighty enough for numerous top scientific organizations to begin taking religion seriously. For example, in April, a landmark three-day conference held at the National Institutes of Health explored how to integrate the growing body of research on health and spirituality into the delivery of clinical care and social services.

Last month, however, national media prominently reported an eight-page study, based on data from two counties in Indiana, comparing small faith-based job training programs to secular ones. The study, co-published by Indiana University and Purdue University, found no differences between the programs with respect to job placement rates and starting salaries, but did find some evidence that clients in the faith-based program worked fewer hours per week and were less likely to receive health insurance than their secular program counterparts. The study's quite able coauthors duly noted its highly pre-

John DiIulio, coauthor with James Q. Wilson of American Government: Institutions and Policies, *ninth edition (Houghton-Mifflin, 2003), served in 2001 as director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liminary character and multiple data limitations. For example, the analysis did not account for potentially salient differences in the program participants' employment histories and other key background characteristics. It was a good little study, but page-one news?

It might help future reporting and civic discourse on the subject if everyone remembered what might be termed the "three rules of three"—there are three faith factors, three types of faith initiatives, and three different levels of scientific analysis relevant to the subject and the policy debates now surrounding it.

One faith factor is *organic* religion: The factor is present when a person believes in God, goes to church regularly, and manifests other cognitive and behavioral religious commitments. A second faith factor is *programmatic* religion: The person participates in a service delivery program led and staffed primarily by religiously motivated volunteers. A third faith factor is *ecological* religion: The person lives, works, shops, or recreates in a neighborhood with higher-than-average concentrations of community-serving religious congregations or faith-based social service delivery programs. To date, the research suggests that each faith factor makes a positive difference. But, other things being equal, does, say, a three-factor low-income inner-city youth do better in school or later in life than an otherwise comparable two-factor or single-factor youth, and, if so, under what conditions? Researchers have hardly begun to address such questions.

One type of faith initiative is *faith-saturated*: The program delivers social services in ways that are inextricably linked to worship services and fostering a lifelong religious commitment to a particular faith. Such programs rarely seek public funds and rarely work across denominational lines or partner with secular or public organizations. A second type is *faith-motivated*: The program is led by religious volunteers but involves no proselytizing, accepts persons without regard to religious commitments, and frequent-

They committed the biggest corporate fraud in American history.
Now the federal government is their number one customer.

They lost roughly 3 times more investor money than Enron.
Then the federal government gave them $772 million in contracts.

They caused $3 billion in losses to employee pension accounts.
They just broke into the top ten of federal contractors.

Crime doesn't pay... unless you're MCI.

Last year, the General Services Administration (GSA) suspended Enron and Arthur Andersen from federal contracts, saying "The purpose of suspension is not to punish a contractor or an individual, but to protect the government from contractors that do not have a satisfactory record of business ethics and integrity."[1]

But somehow MCI/WorldCom skated free.

A surprising fact when MCI/WorldCom's fraud contributed to investors losing $180 billion[2] (roughly three times the size of Enron's collapse).[3]

And since the scandal broke, the government has dramatically increased its business with MCI/WorldCom (up 52% last year).[2] At $772 million in contracts,[4] the federal government is now MCI/WorldCom's biggest customer.[5]

In a report issued June 9th, bankruptcy court examiner and former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh found that MCI/WorldCom's fraud was due to a "virtual complete breakdown of proper corporate governance principles."[6]

Does GSA really think MCI/WorldCom has "a satisfactory record of business ethics and integrity"?

It's time for a full investigation.
American taxpayers deserve an answer.

CITIZENS AGAINST GOVERNMENT WASTE
www.cagw.org

1 General Services Administration; 2 "Well Connected," Fortune 5/28/03; 3 "Enron Lawsuits Must Be Mediated, U.S. Judges Rule," Los Angeles Times 5/29/03; 4 "Top 100 Federal Prime Contractors," Washington Technology 5/12/03; 5 "MCI to Begin Rebuilding of Iraqi Phones," Washington Post 5/15/03; 6 "WorldCom's Ebbers knew of 'gimmickry'," Bloomberg Newswire 6/9/2003.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly works via ecumenical, inter-faith, religious-secular, and public-private partnerships. A third type is *faith-mobilized*: The program rallies and organizes religious volunteers to strengthen good works led by secular organizations or public agencies. Although the public debate remains fixated on programs that proselytize, the vast majority of community-serving religious programs are faith-motivated or faith-mobilized, not faith-saturated.

Major national studies by Penn's Ram Cnaan and others show conclusively that most faith-motivated and faith-mobilized programs led by urban churches, synagogues, and mosques mainly serve poor children and youth who are not members of the congregations, and serve all people without regard to whether they are, or might become, co-religionists. Some faith-saturated programs are indivisibly conversion-centered or can make no meaningful distinction between delivering social services and leading worship services. But others, including Prison Fellowship, accept participants whatever their religious affiliations or lack thereof.

Under existing laws, any such organization is free to apply to administer certain public grants or to accept adult individuals with state-funded vouchers, provided that it agrees to use any public funds strictly for non-sectarian program components (transportation, nonreligious supplies, etc.), and also provided that secular alternatives are available to clients who might wish to opt out. The website of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives offers guidance to faith-based organizations on whether they are eligible to apply.

Finally, in the third "three" worth remembering, one type of research is *experimental*: Participants are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups and compared over time. A second type is *quasi-experimental*: Persons in the program are compared via various statistical techniques to persons with similar characteristics. A third type is *ethnographic*: Persons in the program are observed and their experiences described through interviews and case studies. To date, the empirical literature on faith initiatives features few experimental studies, a growing body of first-rate quasi-experimental studies, plus an older body of ethnographic studies.

In the 1960s, the government began pouring billions of dollars into social welfare programs administered by strictly secular and nominally religious national nonprofit organizations. There was no scientific basis for steering clear of faith-based programs then, and there is none now. As documented in *Unlevel Playing Field*, a report released in 2001 by the White House, despite decades of public funding and federal laws explicitly requiring program performance mea-

"OKAY, SO YOU DEFEATED HITLER AND TOJO, YOU LIBERATED DACHAU AND AUSCHWITZ... BUT DID YOU FIND ANY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?"

Michael Ramirez

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surement, few tax-financed social programs have ever been experimentally studied or otherwise independently evaluated, and almost all those that have been so studied have been found sorely wanting.

In stark contrast, since the first federal law prohibiting discrimination against community-serving religious organizations in the government grant-making process was passed in 1996, much objective research has documented the extent and efficacy of faith initiatives. As suggested in *Better Together*, a report released in 2002 by Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, "whether measured by association memberships, philanthropy, or volunteering," community-serving religious groups "build and sustain social capital—and social capital of more varied forms—than any other type of institution in America," and at least some "faith-based programs can enjoy success where secular programs have failed." Amen. ♦

Put Out Better Flags

Let's unfurl some new designs.

BY STEVE CHAPMAN

When the state of Georgia hoisted a new flag over the capitol in Atlanta last month, it illustrated once again that many people in that deep South state have a powerful attachment to a symbol most Americans regard with indifference or disdain: a state flag. In most places, this item is the moral equivalent of the vice presidency, being insignificant, largely useless, and deservedly ignored. To find citizens passionately debating the design and purpose of their state flag is like seeing a huge rally for a sewer commission candidate.

The newest model is notable mainly because it omits any facsimile of the old Confederate battle flag. Georgians, who are fickle about these things, have had several flags. In 1956, they adopted one with the obvious purpose of giving the bird to the nascent civil rights movement by harking back to slavery and secession. The familiar blue, star-spangled St. Andrew's cross on a red field took up a good two-thirds of the space. In recent years, there have been many demands to junk that flag, and two years ago, the legislature approved a replacement, which shrank the old emblem to near invisibility.



Some people objected because the Confederate emblem was so tiny, some because it was included at all, and some simply because the flag was drab and undistinguished. Widely likened to a Denny's place mat, it was voted the worst in the nation by a group of flag experts called the North American Vexillological Association. The 2001 banner was so unpopular it contributed to last year's defeat of Democratic Gov. Roy Barnes by Republican Sonny Perdue, who promised to let his constituents vote on whether to restore the Lester Maddox-era flag. In a compromise, they'll get to choose between the 2003 and 2001 flags, with the more controversial version no longer in play.

But if Georgia has discarded the nation's homeliest banner, there are plenty of solid claimants to the title. Maybe one reason Americans love Old Glory so much is that it has so little domestic competition. Most state flags are what you'd expect if you asked a committee of accountants to come up with a design and gave them half an hour to do it.

Not much is required of a decent flag. These emblems were originally meant to be easily recognizable even under challenging viewing conditions—at a distance, through the smoke of battle, amid other banners. So several obvious principles ought to govern. A flag needs a simple, clear pattern: A busy, ornate flag makes about as much sense as a subtle window-pane pattern on a football jersey. It helps to have bright colors—mauve and sage really don't do the job.

A flag should be at least slightly distinctive, making it easier to remember. For extra credit, it ought to be meaningful in some way. Old Glory, for example, has a star for each state and a stripe for each of the original 13 states. The British Union Jack combines the crosses of St. George, St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, representing England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The Canadian maple leaf flag honors a beloved tree, as well as the country's vast swaths of wilderness. Japan's red disc pays homage to the myth of the emperor as the descendant of the sun goddess. Israel has the Star of David. France's tricolor origi-

Steve Chapman is a columnist for the Chicago Tribune.

Illustrations by Philip Chalk

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nated during, and pays homage to, the Revolution. All are handsome and dignified. Nobody, seeing one of these flags, would say: Uh, whose is that?

The typical state flag,



by contrast, is a study in confusion or cliché. In most cases, it appears, the designers made a list of all the attributes a flag should have and then chucked it out the window. Instead of striving for simplicity, many of them contain a flea market of images. Several have mottos that can be read only close-up, which is fine for flagpole sitters but useless to anyone else. Not that anyone else is to be pitied for missing Iowa's verbose motto, "Our liberties we prize, and our rights we will maintain" or Massachusetts's "Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem," which is not only wordy but unintelligible to 99 percent of the population. (It means "By the sword we seek peace, but peace only under liberty.")

States that have little else in common somehow managed to show up at the ball wearing the same dress—most commonly, a blue rectangle with indecipherable doodling in the center. Connecticut's resembles Idaho's, which could pass for Kentucky's, which is a reasonable facsimile of Michigan's, which was cloned from Virginia's. Telling these monochromatic flags apart is a task as challenging as categorizing beetles, requiring years of training. Even the most dedicated student of flags would have trouble distinguishing New Hampshire from Nebraska at 50 paces. But given what they and most other state flags have to offer the discerning viewer, why would anyone bother?

Some designers (Illinois, Massachusetts) made a perfunctory stab at originality by replacing the standard background blue with white, but the effect is distressingly reminiscent of a soiled bedsheet. If this were an English class, a lot of students would be flunked for plagiarism. Tennessee's might get a passing grade if it didn't look so much like neighbor Arkansas's. Alabama and Florida apparently got a group rate on their white banner with a red X. Other states would get marked down for belaboring the obvious. Citizens of Oregon, Kansas, and Indiana: Wouldn't you be able to identify the flag flying over the governor's mansion even if it didn't include your state's name?

Some of the flags are not pleasing to the eye but at least attain their own character, which remains unique mainly because no one would want to copy it. Rhode Island's gold anchor on a white field could have been filched off a cruise ship. Colorado's, with a big red C amid three fat stripes of blue and white, belongs on a baseball cap, somewhere deep in the bush leagues. As for Maryland's weird mix of colors and symbols—well, if federal prosecutors want to get Martha Stewart to crack, they might fly one outside her window nonstop.

Some departures from convention work well. Animals are a better idea than you might expect, as demonstrated by California's grizzly bear and Wyoming's buffalo. But representations of people are rare for good reason. George Washington's visage manages to make the flag of Washington look like a very old, very tacky campaign button.

A few states have made a success of their chief symbol. Texas, with simple bars of red, white, and blue and a single white star, not only stands up well on its own, but elegantly complements the American flag. South Carolina's white crescent moon and palmetto tree on a navy background is as simple and winsome as a child's drawing. Arizona, with a blue bar beneath a sunburst of red and gold, succeeds through sheer audacity. Alaska's North Star-over-Big Dipper pattern is a triumph of minimalism. It's no surprise that the flag experts gave the No. 1 ranking to New Mexico's red Zia sun symbol on a bright yellow field. It has everything a flag needs and nothing it doesn't.



But these are the exceptions. There's no reason a nation of flag lovers should have so few flags that are worthy of affection. Georgians are to be commended for scrapping their pitiful old flag. So who's next? ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democrats Go off the Cliff

Powerlessness corrupts

By David Brooks

Across the country Republicans and conservatives are asking each other the same basic question: Has the other side gone crazy? Have the Democrats totally flipped their lids? Because every day some Democrat seems to make a manic or totally over-the-top statement about George Bush, the Republican party, and the state of the nation today.

"This republic is at its greatest danger in its history because of this administration," says Democratic senator Robert Byrd.

"I think this is deliberate, intentional destruction of the United States of America," says liberal commentator Bill Moyers.

George Bush's economic policy is the "most radical and dangerous economic theory to hit our shores since socialism," says Senator John Edwards.

"The Most Dangerous President Ever" is the title of an essay in the *American Prospect* by Harold Meyerson, in which it is argued that the president Bush most closely resembles is Jefferson Davis.

Tom Daschle condemns the "dictatorial approach" of this administration. John Kerry says Bush "deliberately misled" America into the Iraq war. Asked what Democrats can do about the Republicans, Janet Reno recalls her visit to the Dachau concentration camp, and points out that the Holocaust happened because many Germans just stood by. "And don't you just stand by," she exhorts her Democratic audience.

When conservatives look at the newspapers, they see liberal columnists who pick out every tiny piece of evidence or pseudo-evidence of Republican vileness, and then dwell on it and obsess over it until they have lost all perspective and succumbed to fevers of incoherent rage. They see Democratic primary voters who are so filled with hatred at George Bush and John Ashcroft and Dick Cheney that they are pulling their party far from the mainstream of American life. They see candidates who, instead of trying to quell the self-destructive fury, are playing to it. "I am furious at [Bush] and I am furious at the Republicans," says Dick Gephardt, trying to sound like John Kerry who is trying to sound like Howard Dean.

It's mystifying. Fury rarely wins elections. Rage rarely appeals to suburban moderates. And there is a mountain of evidence that the Democrats are now racing away from swing voters, who do not hate George Bush, and who, despite their qualms about the economy and certain policies, do not feel that the republic is being raped by vile and illegitimate marauders. The Democrats, indeed, look like they're turning into a domestic version of the Palestinians—a group so enraged at their perceived oppressors, and so caught up in their own victimization, that they behave in ways that are patently not in their self-interest, and that are almost guaranteed to perpetuate their suffering.

When you talk to Democratic strategists, you find they do have rationalizations for the current aggressive thrust. In 2003, it's necessary to soften Bush up with harsh attacks, some say. In 2004, we'll put on a happier face. Others argue that Democrats tried to appeal to moderate voters in 2002 and it didn't work. The key to victory in 2004 is riling up the liberal base. Still others say that with all the advantages Bush has—incumbency, victory in Iraq, the huge fundraising lead—Democrats simply have to roll the dice and behave radically.

David Brooks is a senior editor at The Weekly Standard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But all of these explanations have a post-facto ring. Democratic strategists are trying to put a rational gloss on what is a visceral, unplanned, and emotional state of mind. Democrats may or may not be behaving intelligently, but they are behaving sincerely. Their statements are not the product of some Dick Morris-style strategic plan. This stuff wasn't focus-grouped. The Democrats are letting their inner selves out for a romp.

And if you probe into the Democratic mind at the current moment, you sense that the rage, the passion, the fighting spirit are all fueled not only by opposition to Bush policies, but also by powerlessness.

Republicans have controlled the White House before, but up until now Democrats still had some alternative power center. Reagan had the presidency, but Democrats had the House and, part of the time, the Senate. Bush the elder faced a Democratic Congress. But now Democrats have nothing. Even the Supreme Court helped Republicans steal the last election, many Democrats feel. Republicans—to borrow political scientist Samuel Lubell's trope—have become the Sun party and Democrats have been reduced to being the Moon party. Many Democrats feel that George Bush is just running loose, transforming the national landscape and ruining the nation, and there is nothing they can do to stop him.

Wherever Democrats look, they sense their powerlessness. Even when they look to the media, they feel that conservatives have the upper hand. Conservatives think this is ludicrous. We may have Rush and Fox, conservatives say, but you have ABC, NBC, CBS, the *New York Times*. But liberals are sincere. They despair that a consortium of conservative think tanks, talk radio hosts, and Fox News—Hillary's vast right-wing conspiracy—has cohered to form a dazzlingly efficient ideology delivery system that swamps liberal efforts to get their ideas out.

When they look to the culture at large, many Democrats feel that the climate is so hostile to them they can't even speak up. During the war in Iraq, liberals claimed that millions of Americans were opposed to war, but were afraid to voice their opinions, lest the Cossacks come charging through their door. The actor Tim Robbins declared, "Every day, the airwaves are filled with warnings, veiled and unveiled threats, spewed invective and hatred directed at any voice of dissent. And the public, like so many relatives and friends that I saw this weekend, sit in mute opposition and fear." Again, conservatives regard this as ludicrous. Stand up and oppose the war, conservatives observe, and you'll probably win an Oscar, a National Magazine Award, and tenure at four dozen prestigious universities. But the liberals who made these complaints were sincerely expressing the way they perceive the world.

And when they look at Washington, they see a cohesive corporate juggernaut, effortlessly pushing its agenda and rolling over Democratic opposition. Again, this is not how Republicans perceive reality. Republicans admire President Bush a great deal, but most feel that, at least on domestic policy, the conservative agenda has been thwarted as much as it has been advanced. Bush passed two tax cuts, but on education he abandoned school choice and adopted a bill largely written by Ted Kennedy. On Medicare, the administration has abandoned real reform and embraced a bill also endorsed by Kennedy. On campaign finance, the president signed a bill promoted by his opponents. The faith-based initiatives are shrinking to near nothingness. Social Security reform has disappeared from the agenda for the time being. Domestic spending has increased.

Still, Democrats and liberals see the Bush presidency in maximalist terms. "President Bush's signature on his big tax cut bill Wednesday marked a watershed in American politics," wrote E.J. Dionne of the *Washington Post*. "The rules of policymaking that have applied since the end of World War II are now irrelevant." The headline on a recent Michael Kinsley column was "Capitalism's 'Deal' Falls Apart," arguing that the Bush administration had revoked the social contract that had up to now shaped American politics.

In short, when many liberals look at national affairs, they see a world in which their leaders are nice, pure-souled, but defenseless, and they see Republicans who are organized, devious, and relentless. "It's probably a weakness that we're not real haters. We don't have a sense that it's a holy crusade," Democratic strategist Bob Shrum told Adam Clymer of the *New York Times*. "They play hardball, we play softball," Gore campaign manager Donna Brazile added. Once again, Republicans think this picture of reality is delusional. The Democrats are the party that for 40 years has labeled its opponents racists, fascists, religious nuts, and monsters who wanted to starve grannies and orphans. Republicans saw what Democrats did to Robert Bork, Clarence Thomas, and dozens of others. Yet Democrats are utterly sincere. Many on the left think they have been losing because their souls are too elevated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When they look inward, impotence, weakness, high-mindedness, and geniality are all they see.

Earlier this year, Robert Kagan published a book, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. Kagan argued that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common view of the world. Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus. The essential reason Americans and Europeans perceive reality differently, he argued, is that there is a power gap. Americans are much more powerful than Europeans, and Europeans are acutely aware of their powerlessness.

Something similar seems to be happening domestically between Republicans and Democrats. It's not just that members of the two parties disagree. It's that the disagreements have recently grown so deep that liberals and conservatives don't seem to perceive the same reality. Whether it is across the ocean or across the aisle, powerlessness corrupts just as certainly as power does. Those on top become overly self-assured, emotionally calloused, dishonest with themselves, and complacent. Those on the bottom become vicious. Sensing that their dignity is perpetually insulted, they begin to see their plight in lurid terms. They exaggerate the power of their foes. They invent malevolent conspiracy theories to explain their unfortunate position. They develop a gloomy and panicked view of the world.



Republicans are suffering from many of the maladies that afflict the powerful, but they have not been driven into their own emotional ghetto because in their hearts Republicans don't feel that powerful. Democrats, on the other hand, do feel powerless. And that is why so many Democratic statements about Republicans resemble European and Middle Eastern statements about America.

First, there is the lurid and emotional tone. You wouldn't know it listening to much liberal conversation, but we are still living in a country that is evenly divided politically; the normal rules still apply; our politics is still a contest between two competing but essentially valid worldviews; power tends to alternate between the two parties, as one or the other screws up or grows stale.

But if you listened to liberal rhetoric, you would think America was convulsed in a Manichean struggle of good against evil. Here, for example, is the liberal playwright Tony Kushner addressing the graduating seniors at Columbia College in Chicago. This passage is not too far off from the rhetoric one can find in liberal circles every day:

> And this is what I think you have gotten your education for. You have presumably made a study of how important it is for people—the people and not the oil plutocrats, the people and not the fantasists in right-wing think tanks, the people and not the virulent lockstep gasbags of Sunday morning talk shows and editorial pages and all-Nazi all-the-time radio ranting marathons, the thinking people and not the crazy people, the rich and multivarious multicultural people and not the pale pale grayish-white cranky grim greedy people, the secular pluralist people and not the theocrats, the misogynists, Muslim and Christian and Jewish fundamentalists, the hard-working people and not the people whose only real exertion ever in their whole parasite lives has been the effort it takes to slash a trillion plus dollars in tax revenue and then stuff it in their already overfull pockets.

Second, there is the frequent and relentless resort to conspiracy theories. If you judged by newspapers and magazines this spring, you could conclude that a secret cabal of Straussians, Jews, and neoconservatives (or perhaps just Richard Perle alone) had deviously seized control of the United States and were now planning bloody wars of conquest around the globe.

Third, there is the hypercharged tendency to believe the absolute worst about one's political opponents. In normal political debate, partisans routinely accuse each other of destroying the country through their misguided policies. But in the current liberal rhetoric it has become normal to raise the possibility that Republicans are *deliberately* destroying the country. "It's tempting to suggest that the Bush administration is failing to provide Iraq with functioning, efficient, reliable public services because it doesn't believe in functioning, reliable public services—doesn't believe they should exist, and doesn't believe that they can exist," writes Hendrik Hertzberg in the *New Yorker*. "The suspicion will not die that the administration turned to Iraq for relief from a sharp decline in its domestic political prospects," argue the editors of the *American Prospect*. In *Harper's* Thomas Frank calls the Bush budget "a blueprint for sabotage." He continues: "It seems equally likely that this budget document, in both its juvenile rhetorical tricks and its idiotic plans for the nation, is merely supposed to teach us a lesson in how badly government can misbehave."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this version of reality, Republicans are deviously effective. They have careful if evil plans for everything they do. And these sorts of charges have become so common we're inured to their horrendousness—that Bush sent thousands of people to their deaths so he could reap government contracts for Halliburton, that he mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and spent tens of billions of dollars merely to help secure favorable oil deals for Exxon.

Sometimes reading through this literature one gets the impression that while the United States is merely attempting to export Western style democracy to the Middle East, the people in the Middle East have successfully exported Middle Eastern-style conspiracy mongering to the United States.

Now it is true that you can find conservatives and Republicans who went berserk during the Clinton years, accusing the Clintons of multiple murders and obsessing over how Vince Foster's body may or may not have been moved. And it is true that Michael Savage and Ann Coulter are still out there accusing the liberals of treason. The Republicans had their own little bout of self-destructive, self-pitying powerlessness in the late 1990s, and were only rescued from it when George W. Bush emerged from Texas radiating equanimity.

But the Democratic mood is more pervasive, and potentially more self-destructive. Because in the post-9/11 era, moderate and independent voters do not see reality the way the Democrats do. Bush's approval ratings are at about 65 percent, and they have been far higher; most people do not see him as a malevolent force, or the figurehead atop a conspiracy of corporate moguls. Up to 80 percent of Americans supported the war in Iraq, and large majorities still approve of the effort, notwithstanding the absence so far of WMD stockpiles. They do not see that war as a secret neoconservative effort to expand American empire, or as a devious attempt to garner oil contracts.

Democrats can continue to circulate real or artificial tales of Republican outrages, they can continue to dwell on their sour prognostications of doom, but there is little evidence that anxious voters are in the mood to hate, or that they are in the mood for a political civil war, or that they will respond favorably to whatever party spits the most venom. There is little evidence that moderate voters share the sense of powerlessness many Democrats feel, or that they buy the narrative of the past two and a half years that many Democrats take as the landscape of reality.

And the problem for Democrats, more than for Republicans, is that they come from insular parts of the country. In university towns, in New York, in San Francisco and Los Angeles, and even in some Democratic precincts in Washington, D.C., there is little daily contact with conservatives or even with detached moderates. (In the Republican suburban strongholds, by contrast, there is daily contact with moderate voters, who almost never think about politics except just before Election Day.) So the liberal tales of Republican malevolence circulate and grow, are seized upon and believed. Contrary evidence is ignored. And the tone grows more and more fevered.

Perhaps the Democrats will regain their equanimity. Perhaps some eventual nominee will restore a temperate tone. The likeliest candidates—Kerry, Gephardt, Edwards, and Lieberman—are, after all, sensible men and professionally competent. But if the current Democratic tone remains unchanged, we could be on the verge of another sharp political shift toward the Republicans.

In 1976, 40 percent of Americans were registered Democrats and fewer than 20 percent were registered Republicans. During the Reagan era, those numbers moved, so that by 1989, 35 percent of Americans were registered Democrats and 30 percent were registered Republicans. During the Bush and Clinton years Democratic registration was basically flat and Republican registration dipped slightly to about 27 percent.

But over the past two years, Democratic registration has dropped to about 32 percent and Republican registration has risen back up to about 30 percent. These could be temporary gyrations. But it's also possible that we're on the verge of a historic moment, when Republican registration surpasses Democratic registration for the first time in the modern era.

For that to happen, the economy would probably have to rebound, the war on terror would have to continue without any major disasters, and the Republicans would have to have some further domestic legislative success, such as prescription drug benefits, to bring to the American voters. And most important, Democrats would have to remain as they are—unhappy, tone deaf, and over the top. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Origins of McCarthyism

What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it?

By Robert D. Novak

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, during his long and illustrious public career, did not flinch from controversy. I doubt, therefore, that he would object to my having inserted him posthumously into an intriguing debate over recent history: Who was responsible a half-century ago for opening the door to McCarthyism and imposing a burden on the Democratic party from which it never has fully recovered?

In a column following Sen. Moynihan's death, in which I praised his uniqueness as a political figure, I concluded with this paragraph:

> A few years ago when I was recuperating at home from a broken hip, the Senator dropped by and brought a copy of *Secrecy*, one of 19 books he wrote. He pointed out the book's disclosure that Gen. Omar Bradley had dogmatically kept secret from President Harry Truman the result of communications intercepts revealing Soviet espionage in the United States. 'How that would have kept the Democrats from the embarrassment of defending Alger Hiss and saved us from McCarthyism,' said Moynihan. I can't imagine another U.S. Senator exploring this, but there was only one Moynihan.

As I entered my office the morning my column appeared, historian and journalist Jerrold Schecter telephoned me with a complaint. A former *Time* diplomatic editor and National Security Council spokesman during the Carter administration, Schecter contended that "Moynihan was dead wrong." He said that six weeks after he became president in 1945, Harry Truman "was told about the secret decoding of Soviet messages," adding: "It was not the bureaucracy that held back the secrets, but the president himself."

That dispute is not trivial, addressing as it does a serious political omission by a president who has become admired and indeed beloved across the ideological spectrum. Was Harry Truman victimized, or did he victimize his own party?

When Pat Moynihan paid his sick call on me in February 1999, he had more than small talk on his mind. He had brought me an autographed copy of *Secrecy*, published the previous year, not just to give me a little light reading, but to send me a message.

The book was an outgrowth of Moynihan's service in 1995 and 1996 as chairman of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, created by act of Congress in 1994. It is an eloquent essay on how bureaucracy breeds secrecy, poisoning government and a free society. Moynihan opened the book for me to pages revealing a specific problem.

As the Moynihan commission acquired the first Venona decryptions revealing Soviet espionage, the senator engaged in speculation. Was FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, who had been sending Truman unsubstantiated claims of Communists throughout the government, now holding out on the president "when real evidence became available"? When Moynihan asked the FBI that question, he related, "agents came round one morning and professed not to know much about the matter, but promised to look into it. They were never heard from again." Such bureaucratic secrecy infuriated Moynihan, who complained to then FBI director Louis J. Freeh. Ordered by Freeh "to sweep the basement," the director's personal staff "produced a loose-leaf binder of Top Secret files: some thirty-six documents, now at last available."

Moynihan's smoking gun was an October 18, 1949, memorandum from FBI agent Howard Fletcher to Hoover assistant D. Milton (Mickey) Ladd describing a conversation with Brig. Gen. Carter Clarke, chief of the code-breaking Army Security Agency (ASA). Clarke was a career officer who worked behind the scenes in communications intelligence for almost his entire career. He was no ordinary staff officer. As a colonel in 1944, he was entrusted by Gen. George C. Marshall,

Robert D. Novak is a syndicated columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times *and a CNN commentator.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Army chief of staff, to put on a civilian suit in wartime to visit New York governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican nominee for president, in a Tulsa, Oklahoma, hotel room on a confidential mission. Dewey had learned that decrypted Japanese communications should have alerted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Pearl Harbor attack and was about to make this a campaign issue. Clarke pleaded that the disclosure would reveal to the Japanese U.S. code-breaking progress. Dewey reluctantly agreed to keep silent, and FDR was elected to a fourth term.

Japanese and German codes were not the only targets of American cryptanalysts during World War II. When Stalin and Hitler signed their infamous "nonaggression" treaty in 1939 that led to their joint invasion and partition of Poland, U.S. Army intelligence secretly ordered American telegraph companies to turn over Soviet diplomatic messages to and from the United States. They were placed in canvas bags and ignored for over three years. In early 1943, the White House approved a decision by Gen. Marshall, recommended by Col. Clarke, for the ASA to start attempting to decode the messages to and from Moscow. The reason was Stalin's obsessive secrecy. Although the United States and the Soviet Union now were allied in fighting Germany, Washington was kept in the dark about the Kremlin's war plans and operations. The Americans hoped the diplomatic traffic (which continued to accumulate through the war years) would shed some light on what the Russians were up to militarily and whether Stalin was seeking a rumored separate peace with Hitler. As the traffic was decoded, by what became known as the Venona project, the U.S. military learned something it had not expected: Soviet intelligence agencies had penetrated deep into the U.S. government for purposes of espionage.

Not for another half-century would this widespread treason in high places be revealed to the American public. The question is whether Harry Truman as president knew about it. The 1949 "smoking gun" memo by FBI agent Fletcher said Adm. Earl E. Stone first learned about Venona in 1949 when he took over the new Armed Forces Security Agency (later the National Security Agency), created as part of U.S. defense unification. Stone was described as "very much disturbed" to learn about the ASA's progress in decoding the Soviet traffic. He "took the attitude" that President Truman and Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency, "should be advised as to the contents of all these messages."

"Gen. Clarke stated that he vehemently disagreed with Adm. Stone," the memo continued, telling Stone that "the only people entitled to know anything about the source were [name deleted] and the FBI." Clarke is quoted as saying that Gen. of the Army Omar Bradley, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, agreed with him. Clarke quoted Bradley as saying "he would personally assume the responsibility of advising the president or anyone else in authority if the contents of any of this material so demanded." According to the memo, Bradley wanted to make sure the FBI did not "handle the material in such a way that Adm. Hillenkoetter or anyone else outside the Army Security Agency, [name deleted] and the Bureau [FBI] are aware of the contents of these messages and the activity being conducted at Arlington Hall [ASA headquarters]." Senator Moynihan's conclusion (as described in *Secrecy*): "President Truman was never told of the Venona decryptions. It gives one pause now that all Truman ever 'learned' about Communist espionage came from the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the speeches of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and the like." For this, Moynihan blamed the fetish for government secrecy in general and Omar Bradley in particular.

In 2002, four years after *Secrecy* appeared, Jerrold and Leona Schecter published a fascinating book called *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History.* The Schecters, who have become leading Cold War historians, totally reject Moynihan's thesis. They contend that the senator misinterpreted the Howard Fletcher memo. The account by the Schecters:

When the ASA experienced its first success in decoding the Soviet messages in 1945, "Marshall urged Clarke to advise President Truman of the project." On June 5, 1945, Truman—in office for only six weeks—met with Gen. Clarke in the Oval Office for 15 minutes. The general told the president that the code-breakers were decrypting messages that revealed massive Soviet intelligence operations in the United States, though it was too early to identify operatives or operations. Clarke described this meeting as "NDG" (no damn good). The president told the general that his account of code-breaking sounded "like a fairy story." Truman obviously did not understand the brief explanation of how Soviet messages were decoded.

In February 1948, Bradley met with Clarke and other ASA officers as the American cryptanalysts made progress. It was agreed that Bradley would control Venona's secrets and keep President Truman informed. At this meeting, Bradley said he understood Truman's failure to comprehend cryptanalysis. The five-star also expressed his opinion that wild rumors about Communists in government passed to the president by Hoover had made Truman skeptical of Venona.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Bettmann / CORBIS

Omar Bradley getting his fifth star from President Truman, September 22, 1950

Bradley did keep Truman informed of new material coming out of Venona. Bradley and ASA officers met with the president's aides at places selected by the White House. As Truman told Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, there were "too many unknowns" in the partially decoded Soviet messages. "Even if part of this is true, it would open up the whole red panic again." Truman told Forrestal he could not believe that President Roosevelt could have been taken in by traitors in his midst. At any rate, Truman said he did not believe that Russian penetration of the government could be as widespread as Venona indicated.

In 1950, Bradley informed Truman that Venona had identified two senior U.S. government officials—Alger Hiss at the State Department and Harry Dexter White at the Treasury—as Soviet agents. "The president was most upset and agitated by this," said Bradley. According to Bradley, Truman said: "That goddamn stuff. Every time it bumps into us it gets bigger and bigger. It's likely to take us down." "In the coming decade," the Schecters write, "the nation would pay heavily for Truman's failure to expose Soviet intelligence networks within the United States. By treating the successes of Venona as a 'fairy story,' the president ceded control of the issue of Communist influence in the U.S. government to the political enemies from whom he had hoped to keep it secret. The result turned America inward against itself, creating a paroxysm of name-calling, finger-pointing, and informing on former party members or suspected Communists."

No notes of the conversations reported by the Schecters are available. Truman, Bradley, Forrestal, and Clarke are all long dead. So, how did the authors learn these details? From a man named Oliver Kirby, who was a bit player in the great drama of more than half a century ago but has outlived his superiors. Kirby first became engaged in cryptanalysis as an ROTC student at the University of Illinois in 1939. That began a career in communications intelligence extending through his World War II service as an army captain and his postwar civilian service with the ASA specializing in the Soviet traffic. Trace all of the above assertions by the Schecters to the footnotes, and Kirby is the source in each instance. Considering the absence of other sources, notably documentary material, Kirby's assertions cannot be verified—with one exception. The Schecters found White House records confirming that Gen. Clarke did meet with President Truman on June 4, 1945, in the Oval Office, exactly as Kirby reported.

I telephoned Kirby in Greenville, Texas, where he lives in retirement. What he told me was just as the Schecters reported. Kirby said he never talked with Truman himself, but he did discuss the revelations about Soviet intelligence with the president's senior aides. Was Truman specifically informed of the identity of Hiss, White, and other Soviet agents in the U.S. government? "I am absolutely sure of it," he told me.

If the Schecters are right and Pat Moynihan was wrong, a question is raised that goes to the duality of Harry Truman's political personality. The statesman who made the decisions ending World War II and fighting the Cold War is also the Kansas City machine politician preoccupied by partisan considerations. The same President Truman who was so decisive in authorizing the atom bombing of Japan, military intervention in Korea, the Marshall plan, Greek-Turkish aid, and NATO could not come to grips with Soviet espionage at home. Truman despised Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers as informants, even though their allegations of Soviet spying were confirmed by Venona. The Truman White House was more interested in bringing perjury charges against Chambers than in probing espionage by Hiss.

As a Truman admirer, Pat Moynihan wanted to believe that bureaucratic secrecy had blinded the president to the reality of Soviet espionage. Unfortunately, the failing may have been in Harry Truman himself. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Get prepared.

By getting involved with your local Red Cross to prepare for the unexpected, you can strengthen your entire community. Begin by making a family disaster plan and assembling a disaster supplies kit. Or consider giving blood, volunteering, getting trained in lifesaving skills or even making a donation. When we come together, we become part of something bigger than us all. Learn how to prepare yourself, your family and your community today by contacting your local American Red Cross chapter or visiting **www.redcross.org**

American Red Cross

TOGETHERWE Make a plan | Build a kit | Get trained | Volunteer | Give blood

Together, we can save a life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Hulton-Deutsch Collection / CORBIS

Crime & Punishment?

Bill James's unconventional mystery novels

By Steve Lenzner

Bill James is the most unconventional detective novelist now writing. In fact, it's almost a misnomer to file his "Harpur & Iles" series under "detective fiction," for one finds little in them of what typically passes for fictional detection. Rather, in Bill James's world, the reader is made witness to the chronic disproportion between the means necessary to fight crime (especially the use of informants or "grasses") and the willingness of the courts and the public to tolerate such means. In the shorthand of Assistant Chief Constable Desmond Iles—ruthless, arrogant, brilliant, amoral, and vain; and his "whole glorious soul devoted to the destruction of crookedness"— "the detective is dead."

The Harpur and Iles series began in 1985 with *You'd Better Believe It* and now numbers nineteen novels—few of which bear much resemblance to the conventional detective novel or police procedural. Killings, to be sure, take place in every Harpur and Iles novel. But they do not always occur at the beginning, nor are they always solved by the end. Four of the books conclude with the killing of a villain—and the reader is left with identifying the leading suspects (on both sides of the law). Only in the series' fourth novel, *Protection*, is one led to believe that detection of a sort will lead to murder convictions. And that exception is brought about by the planting of incriminating material: detection as the art of manufacturing evidence to prove what one already knows. Iles congratulates Colin Harpur for his ingenuity in *Protection* thus:

> I ought to apologize, Col. That business about your not being first division. The rings [you planted]—magnificent. That's long-term planning, the mark of the highest management potential. Prescience is it called? Admirable. When I do my textbook on policing methods, the key chapter will be: Think jury, think jury, think blind and bent British juries and make sure you bring them something no fat QC [Queen's Counsel] can jinx. If I may, I'll cite the rings, Col.

All 19 novels display James's considerable literary virtues, not the least of which is his mastery of the art of understatement. Take Detective Chief Superintendent Harpur—clever, resourceful, persistent, and a study in studied ambiguity ("ultimately was a location Harpur always tried to skirt"). In *In Good Hands* Harpur makes a valiant effort to adhere to the maxim

Naked at the Window
A Harpur & Iles Mystery
By Bill James
W.W. Norton, 224 pp., $23.95

Steve Lenzner is a fellow at the New Citizenship Project.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that one should not speak ill of the dead: "Not a kindly man, but he once told me he would only strike a pregnant woman more than three months on, when it's safer, and I accepted that."

Or consider the point of view of Doug Webb, the villain from *Gospel*. Webb is such a good family man that he has two; after one son is killed in a post-office raid, the boy's brother and mother—Webb's favorite wife—seek solace by turning wholeheartedly to church and vicar: "So, religion was doing filthy damage to one of his families—probably the one he thought most of—which was not what religion should be about at all, clearly."

James treats his characteristic themes—the tension between the just and the legal, the critique of moralism, and the vagaries of identity—in a manner certain to disappoint partisans of all stripes. Yet James has nothing in common with the many writers whose calculated inoffensiveness is the only thing that recommends them. His sympathy for imaginative policing is unlikely to win him many friends in the ACLU, and his "assumption that love and sex will go their own way and that we had better recognize it" will not endear him to friends of traditional morality. Yet James's novels are the product of an astringent lack of sentimentality that sees the attempt to buck necessity as foolhardy—an invitation to pain, if not disaster.

If one wills the end of policing, for example, one must make allowances for the fact that "you can't be on the side of good effectively without a tidy armoury of dirty tricks." Similarly, one is well advised to learn early that a healthy, if not necessarily happy, marriage is one born of moderate expectations. (A variant on this point is memorably captured in the "Brade and Jenkins" detective series written by James under the pen name of "David Craig": "Mair used to tell Jenkins that she and her husband had believed in complete openness with each other. Divorce must have been inevitable.") James altogether lacks the taste and impulse of a reformer—he has no "agenda" other than to describe things as he sees them—and is a better novelist for it.

Even by his exceptionally minimalist standards, James's latest, *Naked at the Window*, is a detective story lacking detection. Though it is not the first novel in which the actions of Harpur and Iles yield no results, it is the first in which their activity is not directed towards the prevention or unraveling of a specific crime or the apprehension or incapacitation of a specific criminal. Indeed, Harpur and Iles are imperfectly aware of what crimes are committed over the novel's course, and they devote precious little energy to sorting them out.



The protagonists' relative indifference—a more-or-less benign neglect—is due in large part to the fact that the crimes are an intramural affair between competing narcotics entrepreneurs. That indifference, however, ends at the point at which the upheavals in the drugscape threaten the stability of their patch: stability, that is, insofar as Iles's unofficial policy of tolerating a decently restrained drug trade in return for peace on the streets is threatened ("the Government was definitely more or less in favor of reducing street bloodshed the last time I heard").

Naked at the Window's real protagonist, or at least its central figure, is James's favorite villain, "Panicking" Ralph Ember, a character who figures prominently in more than half of the series's books. Ember is "headstrong when not pulped by fright," a drug magnate, aspiring civic pillar (with frequent letters to the press on worthy topics), ladies' man, devoted husband and father, etc. "Everyone had multiple identities, and it follows that you should prefer one of these to another. Ember recalled something from his university foundation course, a line by Descartes: 'I think, therefore I am.' It had not gone down well with the lecturer when Ralph suggested it should be: 'I think, therefore I'd like to be someone else.'"

The novel begins with Ember and "Beau" Derek, his radiantly unhandsome assistant, making their regular pilgrimage to the home of bulk supplier Barney Coss. Upon arrival they discover the bloody slaughter of Barney and his associates. The sight makes Ember momentarily sympathetic to his wife Margaret's entreaties that he go strictly legitimate: "It could certainly be argued that a man well-placed in a commercial occupation should not be confronted with bodies on this scale out of the blue." The situation becomes all the more dire when the upstarts who offed Barney return to the scene of the crime and add Beau to their list of victims—just to let Ember know that they plan to fill the vacancy created by Barney's death, a shotgun wedding appropriate to the new millennium.

Ember's supply difficulties coincide with, and are complicated by, Margaret Ember's decision to leave him. Unable to put up any longer with Ralph's participation in the drug trade, she approaches Harpur with a twofold request. In the short term, she wants protection: "Ralph can be extreme, Harpur, if he's pushed." Long term, she wants him to persuade Ralph to quit "what he calls business." Mrs. Ember believes Harpur could successfully do so because "Ralph almost trusts you." Perhaps only in James's world does being

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost worthy of trust make one a paragon of rectitude.

In the series's first novel, *You'd Better Believe It*, James unambiguously called attention to the moral ambiguity inherent in policing: Despite his sympathy for the ordinary desire for moral clarity, Harpur "had to carry on all the same [his work in gray areas]. That was how you fashioned a land fit for those with consciences to live in." With *Naked at the Window*, James provides his clearest account of the value of "the ideal" for policing. Midway through the novel's central chapter, Harpur's talented undergraduate girlfriend Denise manages to work Plato into their conversation. Harpur, reasonably enough, responds, "I heard he had a lot going for him." In good Socratic manner, Harpur summarizes her account of Plato on "the Ideal form" by turning it into a question: "You mean it's higher quality because it doesn't actually exist?"

Similarly, the "ideal" of policing—represented by the chief constable's firm moral principles—doesn't actually exist in practice but must exist in theory as an object of aspiration: "Buried in the ACC's brilliantly contradictory assessment [of the chief's function] lay a statement of what policing would be if it could but it couldn't. Iles was only able to operate his intelligent, murky variants of that ideal as long as he knew Mark Lane's authentic dream remained intact, as dream." That ideal is the necessary standard against which all compromises with necessity must be measured.

Though James has an unusual gift for creating memorable and sympathetic villains (while never letting you forget that they are villains), his singular triumph is the portrayal of "the harsh, long-life alliance" of his series's two protagonists. In *In Good Hands* he writes, "You could say Harpur sat on the ACC's right hand, except when the ACC was using the right hand and probably his left as well to assist law and order in secret, brilliantly jungle ways." Especially noteworthy is the figure of Iles, the only character in mystery fiction to come within hailing distance of Nero Wolfe in terms of his ability to combine superior intellect and amorality—in the service of justice. Yet whereas Wolfe's is a detached philosophic genius, Iles's is a brilliance that maintains an unsteady border with madness. James allows Iles's flawed, admirable brilliance to reveal itself spontaneously, in speech and with characteristic results. By force of character, wit, and mind, Iles makes himself the focus of any scene he's in. Consider this exchange from *Kill Me*. The chief says, "Luckily, we'll be there to prevent anyone killing anyone. Surely, we've had enough deaths, Colin, Desmond. Haven't we?"—to which Iles replies: "Oh, I'm sure you won't expect me to answer that off the top of my head, sir."

Still, Iles appears in a much less appealing light in *Naked at the Window*. Though never a model of self-restraint, the Iles of this latest novel is too consistently feverish, one who reacts—and overreacts—to others even more than he induces others to react to him. Readers who have never encountered James (and Iles) before would therefore be well advised to start with such novels as *Halo Parade*, *The Detective is Dead*, and *Pay Days*. You don't need to return to Rex Stout, Agatha Christie, or Arthur Conan Doyle. Great detective fiction is still being written in our time—even if, in Bill James's hands, it's not exactly detective fiction anymore. ♦

Unsocial Gospel

D.G. Hart on American Protestantism.

BY ROBERT W. PATTERSON

Evangelicals number in the tens of millions in the United States, but you'd hardly know it from their intellectual, moral, and cultural influence on the rest of the nation. Compared with the prestige of Catholic colleges and universities, evangelical schools appear to be second class. Compared with Jewish public thinkers, evangelical intellectuals create very little of the nation's stock of public ideas. This observation is nothing new and, in fact, evangelicals themselves are often the first to concede the point, as did historian Mark A. Noll in his acclaimed 1995 volume *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*. What many Americans may forget, however, is that this was not always the case, but appears to be a casualty of the twentieth century.

That Old-Time Religion in Modern America
Evangelical Protestantism in the Twentieth Century
by D.G. Hart
Ivan R. Dee, 247 pp., $24.95

The Lost Soul Of American Protestantism
by D.G. Hart
Rowman & Littlefield, 197 pp., $37.50

Exactly how evangelical Protestants lost this cultural capital is a complicated story, but one that Darryl G. Hart of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute skillfully dissects in *That Old-Time Religion in Modern America*. The book begins with the first two decades of the twentieth century, when Protestantism had not yet fragmented into the mainline and the anti-mainline, and nearly all Protestants considered themselves evangelical. It then traces the evangelical story through the Scopes Trial of 1925 and the fundamentalist-modernist battles of the 1930s, after which conservatives went underground and started building new educational institutions, commu-

Robert W. Patterson, a former Presbyterian minister, is a domestic policy consultant in Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Green Mountains, Vermont. Buddy Mays / CORBIS.

nication networks, and independent churches, forging a separate Protestant identity under the term *evangelical* with a narrower reference. This emerging subculture still felt much at home in mid-century America; witness the endlessly popular Billy Graham. But Hart documents how—after the cultural revolution of the late 1960s when mainline Protestantism lost its cultural hegemony—evangelicals began to assert themselves aggressively in the public square, particularly in politics, only to find themselves "unwanted, expendable, and in some cases a nuisance."

Hart packs this standard outline with fascinating detail. He highlights, for example, the role that an unlikely missionary to the Swiss Alps, Francis A. Schaeffer, played in shifting the evangelical center of gravity from Fuller Theological Seminary and *Christianity Today* at mid-century to the popular southern televangelists and their explicitly conservative political agenda by the 1980s. While conceding that the transition from "the homogenous culture of the late nineteenth century to the multicultural United States in late twentieth century" played a role in the Protestants' fall from social grace, Hart identifies the internal dynamics he believes most responsible for the current awkwardness of evangelicals in America. The heart of the problem: Evangelicals fundamentally misunderstand the nature of human society and how religion relates to society, especially a secular one. Consequently, "evangelicalism does not give its adherents the tools to adapt to a secular United States because this faith cannot separate religious concerns from public ones." Unlike Catholics who can "distinguish the affairs of the church from those of civil society," evangelicals reverse or simply confuse the sacred and the secular.

"Another way of putting this," Hart writes, is that evangelicals follow a form of Christianity—which, for lack of a better word, we might call "pietism"—that "demands and looks for evidence of genuine religion in affairs not typically considered sacred or religious." This helps explain the success of James Dobson and Pat Robertson in developing financially profitable communication empires that "blur the lines between religious programming and entertainment with religious themes." In both cases, Hart points out how these entrepreneurs exploit "forms of communication that are decidedly different from those experienced in church" and that aim less to evangelize or build the church than to provide an alternative to mainstream entertainment.

In seeking thus to make the world sacred, evangelicals end up making the church secular. During the same decades when they were flexing their political muscles as the Religious Right, evangelicals were simultaneously pioneering dramatic innovations in the public worship of their churches, carving out a whole new Christian music industry where the "most popular musicians are those who sing and write religious words to rock and roll, a form of music not well known for promoting the family values that evangelical politicians and activists trumpet." The ironic consequence: Evangelicals end up with "a religion that on Sunday is comfortable with the church looking like the world (such as [Christian Contemporary Music]) and throughout the rest of the week insists that the world look like the church (as in family values)."

As the former academic dean of Westminster Theological Seminary, an evangelical Presbyterian institution near San Diego, Hart has the credentials to render this unflattering judgment. Yet his more scholarly and more important work, *The Lost Soul of American Protestantism*, makes clear that the confusion of the sacred and the secular is not unique to evangelicals in the late twentieth century, but has been part of the entire Anglo-Protestant experience in America since the mid-eighteenth century.

American Protestants once followed a more traditional, European approach to religion, which Hart calls "confessionalism," that stressed the importance of the institutional church, including creeds, liturgy, and polity. These older-style Protestants valued formal religious ceremonies and corporate practices that nurture the faithful for the life to come. But the revivals of George Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards in the 1730s and 1740s introduced what Hart calls "the American way of faith," which moved the focus of religion away from the church and toward the personal activities of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individual. Dissenting from most historians who look with favor upon the Great Awakening, Hart believes these changes were a theological mistake, directing Protestants on this side of the Atlantic on an endless quest to make religion *relevant* to the here and now.

This separating of "the essence of Christianity from the external practices and observances of it" not only led American Protestants to invest the upcoming American Revolution with religious significance, but also perfectly fit the ethos of the colonies after independence. Just as the new country was freed from the political structures of the Old World, her religion was likewise freed from traditional ecclesiastical arrangements. This new religious economy (reinforced by the Second Awakening of the early nineteenth century) elevated the power of the people to take religious matters into their own hands—to *choose*, rather than inherit, their faith—while dramatically diminishing the authority of the church, forcing clergymen to compete for parishioners like politicians in perpetual reelection mode. Formal denominations and congregations prospered, but they were in actual fact secondary to the vast network of parachurch, voluntary societies established by born-again Protestants to apply, in Whig-Republican fashion, their moral earnestness to the nation at large. The church was not the center of faith, but the place where believers could charge their batteries to do the real work of God in the world.

Hart shows how the nervous energy of this kind of pietism wrought (to borrow a phrase from Joseph Schumpeter) "creative destruction" of anything that stood in its way. It not only blurred significant theological differences between denominations but also marginalized those who tried to hold on to Old World, confessional patterns. Even hard, unified groups of immigrants, such as the German Lutherans and the Dutch Reformed, eventually seemed to surrender. But the greatest damage was suffered by the Presbyterian Church. Presbyterians were just getting settled in the New World when they were blindsided by the controversy generated by the First Great Awakening, which pitted revivalists against Scotch-Irish traditionalists. Foreshadowing a pattern that would repeat itself for two centuries, the confessionalists lost, enabling the followers of John Calvin and John Knox to become the leaders of the American faith, exchanging "the intolerance of creeds, the sectarianism of polity, and the irrelevance of liturgy" for the pragmatic goal of building the kingdom of God in America.

The elevation of pietism over confessionalism intensified after the Civil War, when the remnants of the Old School were tamed again, this time for the sake of the Union, allowing northern Presbyterians to take the lead in church union and federation schemes that would culminate in the formation of the Federal Council of Churches, the twentieth-century counterpart to the benevolent empire of voluntary associations of the nineteenth century. Again, the goal was not so much sacred or religious, a building of the church, but civil and national, a preserving of the Christian America that the Civil War secured. The last vestiges of Presbyterian confessionalism were laid to rest when Princeton Theological Seminary, an Old School holdout, was reorganized in 1929—to such an extent that its prominent New Testament scholar J. Gresham Machen was defrocked in 1935 because his southern style of confessionalism threatened the northern Presbyterian Church's perceived influence on American society.

One may be tempted to read all the great twentieth-century battles of American Protestantism in this way, from the fight between fundamentalists and modernists during the 1920s and 1930s to the war between evangelicals and mainline Protestants in the 1970s and 1980s. But Hart insists that in all these struggles both camps showed their commitment to the idea of the "Social Gospel." In fact, they often made strange political bedfellows: Both supported Prohibition; both objected when Roman Catholics ran for president in 1928 and 1960; and both lamented the Supreme Court school-prayer decisions in the 1960s.



First Baptist Church, Savannah. Dave G. Houser / CORBIS.

True confessionalism had passed from the scene by the early decades of the twentieth century. The National Council of Churches and the National Association of Evangelicals may look as far apart as it is possible for Protestants to be, but they are in fact merely two sides of their shared American way of faith that vanquished the real alternative of confessionalism.

Nonetheless, Hart believes confessionalism is better suited for the cultural and religious diversity of the United States. By lowering expectations of what can be achieved in the public realm, confessionalism reduces the kinds of strains that Protestants have historically imposed on other Americans. In elevating the sacred ministry, it empowers the church to deliver the "spiritual resources to endure the trials of this world." Moreover, because confessionalism "possesses resources for careful reflection about personal and social affairs" (such as the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms and the Reformed doctrine of common grace), it enables adherents to negotiate life outside the church more responsibly. Most important, confessionalism does not lose sight of the essence of religion, "which has more to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do with eternal rather than temporal realities."

Hart's analysis is clearly coherent. *That Old-Time Religion in Modern America* and *The Lost Soul of American Protestantism* take aim at several sacred cows, including the widely held culture-war thesis that American religion has been, at least since the 1920s, split between liberal mainline Protestants and conservative evangelicals. One may not trump both sides of the culture wars quite as easily as Hart seems to imagine, but it is true that the liberal-conservative divide never did justice to such confessional and immigrant groups as the Missouri Synod Lutherans and the Christian Reformed. Most important, Hart argues, the culture-wars analysis "fails to grapple with an ideal that both sides share" as "neither side wants to limit religion to the private worlds of family devotions or worship services."

Against the notion that evangelical religion is largely anti-modern, rural, and southern, *That Old-Time Religion* shows that evangelicalism, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century, was centered in Northern urban centers and strove to be up-to-date in countless ways. Citing such fundamentalist pastors as Mark Allison Matthews and William Bell Riley, who were leaders in urban reform of Seattle and Minneapolis, Hart claims that evangelicals have always been "more oriented to moral reform in this world than the comforts of the world to come." Their lower public profile at mid-century was simply due to the fact that evangelicals had no reason to be engaged politically, given the predominant Protestant mores of the time. Indeed, the whole society was less politically charged than it is today.

Hart's most enduring contribution, however, is his challenge to prevailing assumptions about religion and public life. Many American leaders today, Democratic and Republican alike, welcome a greater public role for religion—something beyond the evangelical public-schools mantra of "prayer in" and "evolution out." Yet most of this discussion concerns how religion can be useful to the state or the society. Hart insists we also look at the issue from the interests of *religion*, believing that religion has a far more profound function in human affairs than helping to build a better society. In fact, he maintains that religion best influences society when pursued for its own sake. Turning H. Richard Niebuhr's 1951 *Christ and Culture* on its head, Hart encourages American Protestants to think less in terms of being crusaders in this life and more in terms of being pilgrims preparing for the life to come. Striving to build a corrective to Reinhold Niebuhr, Hart also offers orthodox confessionalism as the framework with which to understand the ironies of Christian faith and practice in America.

For these purposes, Hart needs to explore the relationship between the New England Puritans and the religious revolution that Whitefield spawned, for those confessionalists certainly prepared the way for the Great Awakening. What assurance do we have that Hart's brand of confessionalism won't do the same? Even Hart's take on more recent events needs some clarification. The religiously neutral, secular state that Hart believes exists today—and which he favors—seems more an abstraction than he realizes. That ideal was never really achieved in the United States, and religion continues to pop up in what Hart would think of as strange places (as, for instance, at presidential inaugurations).

Hart does not consider this question because he is writing not as an informed citizen seeking to improve the affairs of the state but as a churchman seeking to improve the affairs of the church. The result will surely irritate nearly everyone, but his warnings about the dangers of seeking to gain the world while losing one's soul should be welcomed by all who sense that something is fundamentally wrong in the way religion appears today on the American scene. ♦

Band of Neighbors

The sons of Bedford on D-Day.

BY JAMES W. HALEY JR.

Two hundred miles southwest of Washington, D.C.—through Charlottesville, just past Lynchburg—lies Bedford County, Virginia. Bordered by the Blue Ridge Mountains, the James River, and Smith Mountain Lake, Bedford covers 764 square miles of the Virginia Piedmont. The county seat, a small town originally named Liberty in 1782, was renamed Bedford in 1870. On June 6, 2001, President George W. Bush dedicated the National D-Day Memorial, built on eighty-eight acres in Bedford County. It is a proper venue.

The Bedford Boys
One American Town's Ultimate D-Day Sacrifice
by Alex Kershaw
Da Capo, 274 pp., $25

Only around 3,000 people lived in the town of Bedford in the 1930s, and the Depression had struck the primarily farming community hard. Few farmers earned more than $1,000 per year; women worked long hours at the two small clothing mills in the town for $10 per week; the poorest families gathered spillage from Norfolk & Western coal cars that rumbled through the county. Cash was scarce and precious.

One source of funds was the Virginia National Guard, the 116th Infantry Regiment, part of the 29th Infantry Division. The 29th, composed of Guard

James W. Haley Jr. is a judge in Virginia and recently presided in the Circuit Court of Bedford County.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

units from Maryland and Virginia, was accordingly called "The Blue and the Gray," and had served with distinction in France in World War I. During the 1930s, almost 100 young men from the town and county of Bedford joined the Guard. Service entailed two weeks of summer training at Manassas or, for the lucky, at Virginia Beach, and a one day a week drill at the small Bedford armory. The pay was a dollar a day, $14 for the summer, $1 a week for the drill.

Most of the boys from Bedford, including three sets of brothers—named Hoback, Stevens, and Powers—were assigned to Company A of the 1st Battalion of the 116th Infantry. And it was within Company A that the young men trained together over the years. As a non-Virginian replacement later remembered, "They all knew each other as old friends from home."

In February 1941, with World War II underway in Europe, the 116th Infantry was mobilized, and the men from Bedford were issued new uniforms bearing the patch of the 29th Division. They were told they would be released from active service in one year. But when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, that one year became the duration of the war in Europe. On October 4, 1942, the 116th Infantry arrived in England. Twenty months of training followed. By June 1944, Taylor N. Fellers of Bedford had risen to captain and the command of the 193 men of Company A. His friend from home, Ray Nance, was one of his lieutenants. Thirty-eight men from the town of Bedford remained in Company A.

Operation Overlord, the plan for D-Day, June 6, 1944, called for Company A, as part of the assault by the 29th Division, to be the first unit to land on "Dog Green," about 500 yards wide, and the western-most section of Omaha Beach. They were to cross 400 yards of beach, charge up a gully between 150-foot high cliffs, and secure the town of Vierville-sur-Mer, 600 yards inland. In addition to fortifications on the cliffs and barbed wire entanglements on the beach, the Germans had built a concrete gun emplacement at water level defending the gully. This emplacement contained mortars, armor-piercing cannon, and MG-42 machine guns, which fired a thousand rounds a minute. Naval gunfire and bombing was supposed to destroy these defenses. They failed to do so.

Da Capo Press

The Powers brothers: Clyde (upper left) stands above Jack.

At 12:30 A.M. on June 6, Company A boarded a British freighter, the *Empire Javelin*, and headed for France. Captain Fellers had checked himself out from a hospital the night before, because, he told Ray Nance aboard the ship, "I want to go in with my friends. If I don't and something happens to those boys, I'll never be able to go back to Bedford again." That morning he also told Nance, after reviewing photos of the defenses at Dog Green, "Ray, we'll all be killed."

At 4:00 A.M., twelve miles off the Normandy coast, Company A loaded into six landing craft, each boat carrying thirty men. Captain Fellers was in the lead boat, number 910. At 6:30 A.M., precisely on schedule, Company A landed on Dog Green. Ten minutes later, 250 yards from the cliffs,

Da Capo Press

Bedford boys at camp A.P. Hill, 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fellers and eighteen others from the town of Bedford were among the dead.

Landing boat 911, which carried five Bedford boys, had been damaged and sunk on the way in. Rescued and landing several days later, three of these five were killed, on June 9, July 10, and July 11. Of the three sets of brothers, both Hobacks were killed as they landed on D-Day; on June 11, Roy Stevens found the makeshift grave of his twin brother, Ray; and Clyde Powers likewise found his brother, Jack. Both Ray and Jack had perished on the beach with Captain Fellers. Twenty-two of the thirty-eight men from the town of Bedford had died in France.

The telegrams started arriving in Bedford on July 17, 1944. The operator watched horrified as names and more names kept filling the ticker tape. The sheriff, a doctor, a taxicab driver, the drug-store owner, a minister, and other townsmen volunteered to deliver them. Later came the letters from the War Department expressing regret for the sacrifice "for home and country." But like all soldiers in all times, the boys from Bedford also died for their friends.

Alex Kershaw is a journalist, screenwriter, and author of the fine biography, *Jack London*, and of the forthcoming *Blood and Champagne: The Life and Times of Robert Capa*. He performed extensive archival research, especially in Bedford, and interviewed veterans, notably Ray Nance, who, though severely wounded, survived the landing and the war.

Kershaw relates the background of most of the Bedford boys, dead and alive, traces their arduous training and relationships in England, and follows their stories and those of their families, often tragic, following the war. His is a worthy addition to the history of D-Day, and a memorial to the small Virginia town that suffered the greatest per capita loss of World War II. ♦

Father of Faith

David Klinghoffer's life of Abraham.

BY LILA ARZUA

On the outskirts of Kazan, a Tartar city of the former Soviet Union, a huge brick-and-glass structure rises above the countryside. Atop one dome is a Cross; atop a second dome, a Crescent; and atop a third, a Star of David.

This somewhat bizarre place of worship is called the "Temple of All Faiths," and its founder—a man named Ildar Khanov—envisions a day when people of all faiths will pray side by side in the edifice he has constructed.

The Discovery of God
Abraham and the Birth of Monotheism
by David Klinghoffer
Doubleday, 368 pp., $26

Lila Arzua, a former reporter for the Miami Herald, *is a recent graduate of Columbia School of Journalism.*

One doubts this vision will become reality anytime soon. Bloodshed still stalks the lands once roamed by Abraham, the father of monotheism. But some of his descendants—Jews, Christians, and Muslims—continue to seek, if not Khanov's strange unity, then at least amity through their shared history. The most recent is David Klinghoffer, in his book *The Discovery of God: Abraham and the Birth of Monotheism*.

Bruce Feiler's *Abraham: A Journey to the Heart of Three Faiths* has been on bestseller lists since last fall. Klinghoffer—author of the 1998 *The Lord Will Gather Me In*—has yet to make Feiler's sort of splash, perhaps because of the very things that make his book valuable: the endless attention to detail and the depth of his research.

"The issue of Abraham's spiritual estate continues to haunt the Western world, with each religion claiming that it alone truly understands what Abraham meant to teach," Klinghoffer writes. And *The Discovery of God* regularly drops enough titillating details to keep the pages turning. For example: When the family of Abraham, then still Abram, arrives in Egypt, the pharaoh tries to take his beautiful wife Sarai—but he and his entire court are doubled over with a powerful pain in the groin. And had you heard the story that Abraham was a *tumtum*, a person with a defect in which the genitals remain inside his body? Or thought about the possibility that Abraham did kill Isaac?

The Abraham of Klinghoffer's biography is barely likeable but infinitely interesting. Fraught with flaws, he is an imperious landowner who sleeps with his slaves, and time and again he leaves his wife in the lurch. He abandons one son to die in the desert and tries to put another to death himself. The question—asked by everyone from Søren Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling* to Leon Kass in his new study *The Beginning of Wisdom*—is how, despite all this, Abraham can be *Abraham*, the father of faith?

It is direct confrontation with Abraham in all his flaws and all his successes that imbues Klinghoffer's book with relevance for contemporary civilization. The story of Abraham's sons, Ishmael and Isaac, is still central to religious violence that claims lives almost daily in the Middle East. By understanding those sons' father, perhaps we can see more closely the Father himself, the one God worshipped by three faiths that together make up more than half the world's population.

"A great deal rides on our accepting the tradition that the patriarch worshipped the One God alone," Klinghoffer writes. "To put it simply, if Abram wasn't a monotheist, and if we want to be consistent, we must give up any faith in the religions that arise from the Bible." ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"This book did nothing for me."

Books in Brief

***The Teammates: A Portrait of a Friendship* by David Halberstam (Hyperion, 217 pp., $22.95).** Halberstam is a liberal journalist whose political writings you may dislike, but not his sports books. They've all been bestsellers for good reasons. They're knowledgeable, touching, and beautifully written for adults, not adolescents.

The peg for his latest, *The Teammates*, is a road trip to Florida by two former Boston Red Sox players, Dominic DiMaggio and Johnny Pesky, to visit their dying friend, Ted Williams. Their other lifelong pal, Bobby Doerr, couldn't make the trip from Oregon because his wife was ailing.

The four, a second baseman, a shortstop, and two outfielders, now in their eighties, remained fast friends after their baseball careers ended in the 1950s. "For many years, the glue that held them together as friends was Williams," Halberstam writes. "Someone that great, one of the best ever at what they all did, had rare peer power." Williams was irascible, selfish, and often childish, but they loved him. He felt the same about them. Visiting for two days in a nursing home, DiMaggio found Williams wasn't getting baseball scores every day. "When the next season started, Dominic called him every morning with the latest Red Sox score and an update on how they were playing," Halberstam writes.

The four had a bond from playing on great Red Sox teams that tragically never won a World Series. Halberstam tells the story of each player, when they met, their marriages (all lasted but Williams's), their skill as ballplayers and teammates, their success later in life. And Halberstam shows how different they are from today's players—less wealthy, smaller egos, but blessed with maturity, strength of character, and good sense. They act like men, not overgrown and pampered boys. If this book doesn't bring tears to your eyes, no sports book will. Try fiction instead.

—Fred Barnes

***Ciao, America! An Italian Discovers the U.S.* by Beppe Severgnini (Broadway, 256 pp., $25.90).** With transatlantic relations at their lowest point since before World War II, Severgnini's *Ciao, America!* seems almost a trip down memory lane. An Italian journalist, Severgnini spent a year in Washington, ostensibly to write columns for *Corriere della Sera*. Actually, he used most of his time to record his impressions of America, and the resulting book was so popular in Italy when it was published in 1995, Severgnini's small house on 34th Street became a stop for Italian tourists visiting D.C.

Now appearing in translation, *Ciao, America!* is full of witty commentary about American life. From the obsession with air conditioning to the travails of shopping for a mattress, Severgnini has an eye for the subtle differences in culture. The book also shows the author's love for America, as when he watches fireworks on the Fourth of July: "This is an America that warms your heart. It is the united, unpretentious, honest country that exists only in schoolbooks and presidential addresses. And it is here, this evening, on a dark riverbank."

Unfortunately, *Ciao, America!* also shows how things have changed since Severgnini lived here. In a column in *Corriere della Sera* this year, he wrote of America, "We are not your subjects. It is our duty, not just our right to criticize you. Would you believe me if I told you that I have recently begun to appreciate what it must have felt like to be an Indian under the British Raj?" Robert Kagan has insisted, "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world." And he's right. But *Ciao, America!* is worth reading, if only to remember how recently Europeans changed their minds about America.

—Jamie M. Fly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CBS barters for Lynch exclusive: Network deal includes book, movie offers, spots on MTV. —*News Item*

Parody

Skank Media
$6.50
(IS THAT A RIP-OFF OR WHAT?)
C$11, £5.26
(EVEN WORSE OVERSEAS?)
HOW DO YOU TYPE THAT STUPID EURO SYMBOL?
SHELF LIFE: 10 MINUTES

VARIETY

THE BIBLE FOR SHALLOW ENTERTAINMENT TYPES ■ JUNE 16-22,

SPOIL
INS
PE
LEFTIST
WACKO
BEGINS O

Sean Penn Sex Change p. 6

Actor strikes pose, grows same goatee p. 6

Eye prexy ankles for Frogweb

the weekly Standard
JUNE 30, 2003

C-SPAN BAGS LYNCH

Aggressive Play by Yawner DC Cabler Beats CNN, Other Nets to the Big Get

By VICTOR RENO

After facing down stiff competition from ABC, NBC, Fox, and CBS, C-SPAN has scored the first coveted interview with Iraq War POW Jessica Lynch. NBC sent Lynch a package of patriotic books. ABC sent a locket with a photo of Lynch's home. Fox offered dinner with Shep Smith, a cameo on The Simpsons, and a special guest-starring appearance on the Beltway Boys. CBS offered a book contract, pic deal, and a chance to host MTV's Total Request Live.

But all of these efforts were eclipsed by C-SPAN topper Brian Lamb's full court press, which displayed the media might of the cable network.

The lobbying campaign began when one of C-SPAN's yellow buses arrived in Palestine, West Virginia, and pulled into Lynch's driveway. Out popped Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute and Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution, who thrilled Lynch, 20, and her friends with accounts of succession plans should the U.S. Capitol building be struck with a nuclear bomb.

Lamb then emerged from the bus himself, to the shrieks of West Virginians, and offered Lynch a package of goodies, should she agree to appear first on Washington Journal, the network's ayem program. For example, Lamb promised to place Lynch's name on the Cato Institute's mailing list, so that she could receive up to 34 mailings a week on the need for Social Security privatization. He offered her a chance to host "Senate Parking Lots," one of the net's behind-the-scenes looks at the life of members of Congress. He offered her a special screening of "The Wayne Allard Story" along with a chance to meet the charismatic Colorado senator, or at least his legislative assistant.

Lynch seemed immediately receptive to C-SPAN's campaign. She said that just that morning she had been watching C-SPAN 2's "Book TV," and had particularly enjoyed a panel discussion entitled, "Adventures in Proofreading," which had been taped six years earlier at the Southwest Ohio Book Fair. The deal appeared clinched when Lamb reminded her that of all the nets, his was most likely to allow Lynch to express her opinions on the Food and Drug Administration's drug review process.

Lynch will appear on a special eight-hour edition of Washington Journal (expanded from its normal six-hour slot), opposite David Corn of the Nation. As part of their agreement, Lamb promised to take no calls from California, where it will be 4 A.M., and only the true nutbags will be awake.

Ryder c carjacki p. 22

BUSTED AGAIN: *W appeared in County court enteenth tim yesterday, a jacking a lat sedan with strapped in and their el mother in th seat, hooked of oxygen. 32-year-old the car beca late to a co community sion at a re In Ryder's found a co white table are in the tifying.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Will the Education Gap Ever Close?

Paul T. Hill is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution; a member of Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education; and a research professor and acting dean at the University of Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs.

Twenty years ago, this country was rocked by a national education report called *A Nation at Risk,* describing the inadequate preparation our public schools were providing for our children. **Two decades after the report's bleak assessment, we have seen little improvement—a lack that is especially glaring in the minority and underserved schools in big cities.**

A Nation at Risk assumed that raising expectations would benefit all students. But this did not hold true for children who started school with a skills deficit or who attended schools that could not meet the easier standards in place before *A Nation at Risk* was issued.

The gap between white and minority fourth graders is as big now as it was then. On the fourth-grade National Assessment of Educational Progress, white fourth graders are still three times more likely than African American and Latino children to be rated proficient in math and reading. Statewide standards-based testing programs did not exist when *A Nation at Risk* was published, so there are no long-term data. But current results show huge gaps between poor minority children and others.

A Nation at Risk has also failed to improve dropout rates, high school graduation rates, and rates of college enrollment. Today only 50 percent of inner-city high school freshmen graduate four years later. Of those who graduate, only 55 percent are likely to attend college, compared to 65 percent of white students. And once they are in college, black students are 17 percent less likely to graduate.

The recommendations from *A Nation at Risk* assumed that educators—responding to pressure—would work hard to make a difference in children's learning. These assumptions ignored three facts: first, local school boards are political bodies pursuing many agendas, of which educational effectiveness is only one; second, school districts allow resources to follow political influence, so that poor students end up receiving the least money and the worst facilities; and third, teachers with seniority and other attributes that make them attractive can usually avoid teaching the most disadvantaged children in a school district.

The system needs to change so that schools are free of politics. School boards should have one job: making sure every child is receiving a good education. This means closing bad schools and creating options for students who are not learning.

Schools in the poorest neighborhoods need the freedom to find the best combination of people and technologies for the children they serve, including access to dollars and good teachers. Schools that get the worst of everything are now frozen by rules and contract provisions.

Finally, **parents and taxpayers need to know how individual schools are performing**, and families must be able to move children from stagnant schools to higher-performing ones.

Twenty years of underperforming schools for those students who can least afford it is inexcusable. High expectations are well and good, but they need to be backed up with the resources and the freedom to change that will make a difference. And nowhere is this truer than in our big-city schools.

— Paul T. Hill

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Interested in reading more?

***Contact us to receive a complimentary copy of chapter one, the* Findings and Recommendations of the Koret Task Force on K–12 Education.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Buying a car? New credit laws could drive you crazy.

Walk in and drive out? Not if Congress fails to renew key provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). It would mean a patchwork of conflicting laws administered by the states and a bureaucratic nightmare of red tape. A mess like that could make everything from financing a new car to obtaining a mortgage more time consuming and expensive.

FCRA established a nationwide, streamlined system of consumer credit that works. It ensures accuracy, fairness and confidentiality for consumers as well as an unprecedented level of choice and service. That's why Congress needs to protect that system. Find out how it works for you by visiting our Web site at *www.ProtectConsumerCredit.org.*

PARTNERSHIP TO PROTECT CONSUMER CREDIT

Giving Americans the Credit They Deserve.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED